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Doe .Y.!. McMillan

~

Cert tc!l theCA DC (Miller, Wright

&

MacKinnon)(Wright, dissenting)

SPEECH & DEBATE CLAUSE CASE
Petrs are a class of persons composed of students at

--"·' ··-

Jefferson Junior High School in the District of Columbia and
their parents and guardians.

Resps are (1) the chairman and

==-

members of the House Committee on the District of Columbia,
(2) the clerk, staff director, counsel, and a consultant
to the committee, (3) the Superintendent of Public Documents
and the Public Printer (GPO), (4) the president and members
of the board of education of the District of Columbia, (5) the
DC Superintendent po public schools, (6) the principal and a
teacher at Jefferson Junior High School, (1) a DC police
officer acting as investigator for the committee, and (8) the
United States.

-2Petrs commenced this action for damages, a declaratory
judgment, and an injunction against further publication and
distribution of a report of the House Committee on the
District of Columbia on the DC school system unless 45
pages thereof were altered to delete certain names of students.
The pages refer to disciplinary matters, absentee lists,
test scores, etc.

Petrs contended that dissemination of

the report so long as it contained their names

lfD~IDI

would violate their constitutional and common law right of
privacy, would constitute a bill of attainder, would deny
them due process of law, would violate the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, and would cause severe damage to their mental and
physical health, .their reputations, and their future careers.
They also alleged that publication of their names was devoid
of any legislative purpose.

II

The USDC dismissed the complaint, and CA DC affirmed,
over a strong dissent by Judge Wright.
CA DC held that the Speech & Debate Clause protected
from suit

~ the members

of the

the con-

gressional employees and officers, insofar as they were acting
and
pursuant to valid legislative authorization/ in furtherance
of a proper legislative purpose.
these elements were p:r:esent.

The CA DC concluded that

The court also noted that

the concept of separation of powers and notions of judicial
restraint made the USDC's dismissal of the complaint proper,

l

for the report had already been published and there were
apparently no plans to publish additional copies.
CA DC held that the DC resps . (school board members, prin•
cipal and teacherp and the school superintendent), as well
as the federal legislative employees, were protected from

-3liability by the doctrine of official immunity, because
they were performing discretionary acts within the scope
of their official duties • •

FOX advises that the case be held for GRAVEL.

He is

familiar with this case in connection with his work on Gravel,
and he will take this case up with you when Gravel is settled.

HOLD FOR GRAVEL

CEP
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No. 71-6356
Doe v. McMillan
Cert to CA DC

This case was held for decision in Gravel.

Justice

White has circulated a memorandum noting that the case
deals at least in part with issues not reached by Gravel.
He recommends that certiorari be GRANTED.

CEP

BENCH MEMO
No, 71 .. 6356
Doe v. McMillan
CERT TO CA DC a Miller , MacK innon; dis sent ing: \vr ight
In the course of an investigation by the House Committee
on the District of Columbia, officials of the D.C. school system

----------------------~
divulged
information about various pu];>ils in the

:skllf~

system which was incorporated into a committee report.
information contained such things as

:ai:i:elil:eN:i:~

school
The

alledged sexual

advances by a specifically named pupil toward a teacher, absentee
reports containing names, test

named, who flunked reading tests,
information,

scores

:s~~lll

m~:a

of persons, again

and other embarassing

R

The report was ordered into print by resolution

of the entire House sitting as a committee of the whole (which
is, I gather, a standard procedure).

This action was commenced

-2-

-

by parents of some of the students named in the report, who
were allowed to proceed

s:nlli:exxfi:~&:lr:i::

anonymously, seeking damages,

a declaratory judgment, and an injunction against further publication
of the report unless 45 pages of the
Nex:Ke deleted,

xeN~x

report were lli:exeg

The Neex defendants were the members of the

House committee, xx:i:: various employees of the committee, govt
printers, various D.C. school officials, and the United States.
The District Court dismissed the complainS holding that
the committee investigation was in good faith and that it was
without power under the seperation of powers principle to
:i:: enjoin it,

It further ruled that the employees of Congrees

--------------------------~-------------

and the D.C. govt were protected by the doctrine of official
immunity,
...._
~-

J..

The suit against the U.S was found to be imporoperly

brought under the 'fort Claims Act because petrs had not exhausted
all available remedies according to the procedures specified in
that act.

Petrs appealed to

CA

DC.

A temporary injunction

pending appeal was entered prohibiting

fu~er distribution

and publication of the report as long as it contained the names
of the

pupil~,with

the exception of the absentee lists which

the court did not find to be damaging to the children°s reputations.

-

The Court of Appeals concluded, by a 2-1 vote, that it

---

-

-

had no jurisdiction over the case,

It concluded that Congress

had prevasive power, under the Constitution, to govern D.C.,
and that that power was accompanied by the power to investigate
the running of the D.C. agencies, including the school system.
The Speech or Debate Clause was found to

teet the legislators

from the suit for damages and from the annoyance of defending

-3against the injunction.

It was found that the

iR~%Mxxxs

inclusion of the materials in the report was within the legitimate
sphere of legislative activity, because the naming of names was
supposed to increase the credibility of the report.

It was

ruled further, that when employees of Congress, such as the
printers and committee staff people, are acting pursuant to
legislative XMKNHXXRX

a~thorization

in furtherance of a proper

legislative purpose, they too were immune.

In addition to the

speech or debate ratioaale, the court indicated that

i~XIl§M%x

it could also rest on a sepration of powers theory or upon
judicial restriant of some sort.
~MKRXRMRRK

---

The employees of the D.C.

school system were found to be immune from suit

under the doctrine of official immunity.

The theory is that

if officials are not free from suit in the course of the exercise
of NXXEXN discretionary decisions, they will be
conduct their duties.
had

XN

unable to

It was noted that after this incident

xxxxMN~exWxi~kXxNixxeRKRNXX

occureed, the school board

had adopted a policy of confidential lit¥ which would prevent
such incidents in the future.

.

Judge
Wright NXN dissented.
--.;;;;,_

He did not reach the question

of whether the members of the committee were protected by the
Speech or RE!e Debate Clause, but ruled instead that the employees

u.s.

of Congress were not.

Relying on Powell v. McCormack, 395

486

that judicial immunity was to prevent

~----(1969), he ar~ued

intertierence with legislative tasks and that this would not
result from a suit against the employees.

He thought that

separation of powers was no obstacle because that doctrine

-4-

should not be used

if the individual rights of citizens

~Nx~xex

are allegedly being infringed,

Nor does he think the matter is

a political question, textually committed to another branch,
Reacfuing the merits, he argued that the power of Congress to
~NN

conduct investigations and issue reports, while broad, is

not unlimited, He argues that the information involved in the
~------report
will severely damage the x~e reputations of the named
violating their rights to privacy
i::mti:~xxi:xai:i:ia individuals/and that i::s it serves no legitimate
legislative purpose. Finally, he argues that the majority simply
ignored major issues in the case which were dismissed below
without a hearing.

For example, there was never any proog that

the action of releasing the information was a discretionary
action of the school officials and hence protectable by the
official immunity doctrine,

One of the parties was an indpendent

conslutant to the :SNDml committee, and dlamages might lie against
him,

Similarly, one of the investigators was a D.C. policeman

who may have exceeded the

:sa~N

scope of his officials duties,

Judge Wright would remand the case Nf for a hearing on

~ki:e

these issues.
No briefs have been filed in this case as yet, and since
the decision below was decided and cert was granted before the
\

recent decisions in Brewster and Gravel, it is

~N:s:sxXi:e

likely

that the focus of the arguments will shift somewhat in light
of those two cases,

Relying on petrs 0 cert

there are four issues in the

~

case,

~e~i:N

petition,

There is also a potential

mootnessixxRexx:sx~iai:mxxka~xxkex~Mmxi:~axi:NKXNfxxkexxe

---.
the report

has been issued,

- -

claim, since

Petrs contend that further action

is necessary to prevent further pbulication.
what this means.

I am not sure

If it refers to republication, a than there

is probably jurisdiction under the re(t\tfiction part of the
Gravel decision to consider the case.

attainder.

The Consltitution forbids Congress from enacting

bills of attainer.

A bill of attainder has been defined by

the Court in Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall 277 as

11

a legislative

act which infld:cts punishment without a judicial trial."
\'&ia

A

classic example would be a case in which the legislature

by statute declares that a named indifidual should be sent to
prison.

The most recent case involving a bill of aka attainer

was United States v. Lovett, 328

u.s.

303 (1946),

in which the

Court struck down a statute providing that certain named govt
employees :i were not entitled to

~m

compensation from govt jobs.

This was found to be a way of punishing the individuals by
denying the the privilege of govtt employment, and the Court
found it to be a bill of attaineer.
It seems to me that in this case, it is stretching the
facts a bit to say that publication of this report is
legislative punishment of the named pupils.
~:nxa:nxxnl!txl!t

~NNX~xa:i

Adverse comment

is not traditionally regardel!t as punishment; it is

not analagous to depriving the petrs of an ex economic benefit
such as the right to government employment.

If this is a bill

-6-

of

attainde~r,

Congressional
then every g:l!!lxk/report which criticizes named

individuals, whether for cost over-runs or inefficent performance
in a job is also a bill of attainder,

I think this position

./ te d ,
must b e reJc

2, The second question presented, according to the
petition is whether the Speech or Debate cl~use requires
agaLnst the Congressmen
dismissal of an uncontroverted complaint/xsxx alleging that

~XX:

a report issued

-

the ptrs.

b~Congressmen

will invade the privacy of

Basically, petrs claim that the courts should balance

the speech orN debate interest with the
interests of petrs,

«aRk~M~kx±xx~x~xk

privacy

They argue that petrs have no other xasxm

forum in wRRk which to assert their rights and that in cases
like the Powell case the Court was willing to review legislative
acts when they interefered with the rights of individuals,
Mono .ver, they seem to argue that the report was not within
'
the reasonable realm of legislative activity, at least insofar
as it names names, because there was no specific autrffjizatian
for such a report, although there was

~

a general authorization

to investigate the D.C. govt, and becauee the information xax
NxiHax did not have to be published.
This all seems to me to be a strange analysis of the
Speech or Debate clause.
xs~x

Cases

xk~xR

like Powell concerned

inquiries into the power of Congeess to engage in certain

acts.

In Powell, the issue was whether or not Congress could

refuse to seat an elected Congressman on the grounds other than
those specified in the Constitution,
x~Raix«

In other cases concerning

recalcitrant committee witnesses who claimed that the

-7committee had no power to ask them certain questions and thus
that they were no guilty of contempt of Y Congress, the issue
was the same,

Indeed in Gravel, the cases relied on by petrs

were distinguished in j~lt this waya
~NNHRXNXXXMRXRXXMXRRXRXXRXXXNN~XRNXXMRXXXM~XHX~XN~NXXXXNH
XMXXXXMMMHXK~XK.HXXNHBXxXXXEXRXKNXMNMXRXNXXRNMMXKKRRX
~M~iN~HRXxERRXMXRxKMR~XKRXRXRNKXRR~XRXRHKHKXxRXXNX
8HRXXNXX~XXXKMRX¥XXMMMHXK~XMHXXMRHEXMRHXXXXXEXRXERRXMXRX

:xmcMXXMHJ<XHRgXgHNXXNXXiiegXXXRNRNMRKXMMXRMXKHXXRNK
RNXXXXRNXKNXS~RRRMXNXxBREXKR~tHMXR~XNKRRKXNHX

There can be no question that Congress is entitled to
issue

N

committee reports, nor is there any question that the1

committee report involved in this case was, by and large,releated
to a duty of Congress,

-

to be analagous
the

_!;P

Thus, this case does not seem to me

Powell because it does not really challenge

power of Congress,
Instead, petrs are actually arguing that when axiegiximaxe

HXRX«XXRXNX~NRgXRXXXNRHiXXRXXXXK~RNRXiXRKXXMXKM le~islative

activity conflicts with the interests of individuals, the

-

Speech or Debate Clause does not necessarily prev.ent the
courts from interfering with the legislative activity.
think this is an imq¥
Debate Clause,

I

er interepretation of the Speech or

It seems to me clear from XNMXRNH Johnson,

Brewster, and Gravel, that if activity is iegxixxi legislative
activity and hence protected by the Clauseo the Court has no

gMxx jurisdiction to interfere with it.

Supervision is left

entirely in the hands of the legislature.
/l
,,
The crucuial question therefore is whether or not the
activity of xxxMe publishing a committee report is legislative
activity protected by the Clause,

I think it clearly is, and

there is language in Gravel that supports that interpretation.

/

-8-

~~::::::~
~

"Committee reports, resolutions, and the act of voting
are eN~x equally covered by it; 'L-i7n short, • • •
things generally done in a session of the House by
one of its memeber in relation to the business
before it' • • • • "

Therefore, I would say that a committee report is a legislative
act which is beyond

the~

power of the courts to enjoin or

toe otherwise interfere with because of the Speech or Debate
~ax

Clause.

There is, however, on additonal problem which has not
• "' .. s ( I e:' tv"
been specifically
·
in the cert petition, but which may
come up in light of Gravel. &s you will recall, Gravel held that
republication of the Penatagon Papers, which were a part of the
subcomittee reocrd, was not protected by the Speech or Debate
C' ;ause.

In this case, the publication by the House of the

section of the report under challenge has already taken place.

-

Petrs seek only to prevert: further publication of the report.

-

I am not quite sure whether this means publication by another
ublisher, as in Gravel, which might therefore be considered by
the Court or whether it means distribution of the committee
report by the Congress.

If it ma« means the latter,than there

is a ::l11:11Mei:IIR somewhat interesting quest..i.on whether public distribution
of a Congressional report by Congress itself is a leg ~dlative
act protectee by the Clause.

I tend to xkRk think that it is

not covered if republication is not, because distributing the
report to the general

~E

public is not essentially a part of

the xegxx leg islative process.

I do not mean that a court could

enjoin the press from picking it up, but it may be possible to

-9-

enjoin the House or their employees from futher distribution
If that is in fact what petrs seek, it may be that they are
entitled to xxxxx it, provided that they can make their case
that distribution would interfere with a }!!XK3ellfX}!!XNKegxiN
protected right,
3,

They would thus be entitled to a remand,

Pe~s' _ n::S~~stion,

assuming that there is speech

or debate protection for Congressman, is whether there is
pr~ection

for employees such as staff aids and printE'fS,

They note that in Powell, the Court did not enjoin the Members
of Congress but did enjoin employees like the doorkeeper and
seargeant of arms,

This was done because there are some difficult

~XENMe problems arising out of the ~peration of powers regarding
1\

the courts' power to

eN.%~

enjoin a member of Congress, even if

the act is not protected by the Speech or Debate Clause,

Gravel

was not decided when the petition was filed, but there was a
CA 1 opinion.

Petrs distinguish the CA 1 opinion xblk which also

) held that aids were able to assetx the privilege, by saying

~hat

the

}!IN~

people invloved in this case are

~x

not close

personal aids of the Congressmen,
My reading of Gravel suggests that the Court means that
any employee who assists in the performance of a xegxixx legislative
act protected by the Speech or Debate Clause can not be interfered
with by the Courts,

Congressmen have to act through aids, whether

they be }!!Xi:N.gx printers or legislative assistancs,

And xx it is

little more than a sham to say that publication of a committee
xe}!!9xx report xx is protected xx activity as long as the Congressmen
do the chores of printing themselves.

On the othern hand, as

-10=
I suggested above, it is possible that the Court might find
that public distribution of the document by Congress, i.e.
distibution to persons other than Congressmen, was not a legislative
act and that employees who attempted to engage in that N:X:sxx
distribution could be enjoined.
4,

The final issue is the liability of the D.C. school

officials under the discretionary action doctrine.

The argument

is that merely labeling the act discretionary is not enough
to immunize an offical from suit. Petrs argue that it is not
enough to determine that the function of the offical is discretionary;
the courts must also determine that the nature of the function is
such that it would be

XNNXEX~

inhibited if this kind of law suit

could be brought.

This was not done in this case despite the

fact that the D.C.

e4:-:!?tilli>:ir~

c..~

has said that this is the law in

D.C.
This is a somewhat strange issue.

For one

it is not claar whether the ruling below, which is
~x:X~x:X~¥x:X:sxE

common law,

thin~,

-r

kE

4
J>J
sg~aw&a•Q e?

cryptic, is based on federal law or the D.C.
If the latter, than this issue would seem to be

aNaxgN analagous to a state law issue which is not for this
Court.

The starting point for analyzing the immunity of federal

officals from suit is SaxxxxxXMR:KeN Barr v. Matteo, 360
\ 564

tx9&

(1959).

u.s.

In that case, dismissed federal employees

sued the Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stablization
for a press release which they alleged had libeled them.
The Court XNNN found that the officer was privleged from suit,
but there was

HNX

no clear majority.

Justice Harlan, x:Xx writing

for three other members, found the case to be close, but found
the act of issuing the press release to be within the discretion

-11-

of the def and thus absolutely privleged,

He argued that

such discretionary acts are privileged because federal officals
need to be free from the annoyance of suits in order to perform
t1 r duties and that the balance between not affording persons
with just x grieveances against federal

~ffx~xix

officials

some relief and preserving the freedom of the officals required
such a p~ilege.
emphasis

~HX~H:K

Justice Black concurred, but he placed special

not on the fact that issuing press releases

was within the officials duites, but on the fact that this
was an exercising of the informing function of public officials
which he believe too important in a democracy to be impaired
by suit,

The principal dissent by Warren argued that lower

officials should have no
\

privilege.ex~e~xx~~xxxEi~x

Justices

Brennan and Stewart also dissented,
Barr v. Matteo is thus somewhat shaky precedent, but
it seems at a minimum to requires

~

some kind of decisionj;Uat

the act of the offical w "ch is the subject of the suit must
be a discretionary act--that is an act

xN:x~:kxki:xxx

within the

scope of his duties in which he must exercise his discretion.
It is not clear to me that such a finding has been made here.
R3xexexxM~eix

For example, one of the officials is a high school

'\ teacher, and I doubt whether releasing information EX about
Jpupils to the public is within a teacher's regular duties.
On the other hand, it may well be that there is some kind of
agency relationship with Congress so that all the persons who
gave the information to Congress in the course of the

xmcexxi:~x~x

investigation are bathed with some kind of immunity.

\ve actually

don't know quite enough about what happened,

Not knowing much about what hapf)ened makes it somewhat
difficult to know what to say about

th~s

issue,

But it does

seem to me that the Barr v. Matteo solution is not much help.
The opinion is very :kl vague,

It does not say xa what a discretionary

duty is or how far down into the governmental heirarchy it
extends.

It gets a bit xei ridiculous to argue that someone

like a garbageman has a privlege against suiS not shared by other
person~

because he happens to be a federal offical.

Therefore,

assuming this issue is squarely within the case, it might well
stand a careful re-examination designed to produce a formula
at least more
Perhaps the

intelligible than the Barr doctrine.
1-"C'-t 't / ""~' m"' r'l " - ('.( . I
~ a finding that XkexxMR«K

iRxeix~ii

the ability to sue might impair governmerAJ-1 functioning is a
~~good

one.

My thoughts are tenative at best, but I do not

think you should be reluctant to re .. examine the issuel,

All the

law in this area is judge-made and there are few precedents,
And, since Barr did not even command a majority of the Court,
it is not a strong precedent on which peDple can rely as heavmly
as some.

For my own part, I think a govt official who ixexi±xei

libels someone in a press release
from suit than a press agent for a

~xxa

should be no more immune

~l!!IXI!!BXXaaxx~ax~~t~xaxDi!~RxJdm*

corporation who libels someone in a press release, and I think
that a public shoool official who interferes with a pupil's rigth
to privacy (which is the uncontested allegation here) by releasing
private information should be no more exempt from
a private school employee.

XNNx

suit than

My guess is, however, that there are

so many other things involved in this case, like acting on

committe orders--assuming that is what happended, that these
larger issues xkiiixNNK will not have to be reached.

Nevertheless,

I think a remand on this particluar issue might be called for.
Fox
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

January 2, 1973

Dear Chief:
I am assigning 71-6356, Doe v.
McMillan to Byron.

The Chief Justice
cc:

Conference

Bill Kelly

No . 71-6356 Doe v . McMillan
Here are all communications which I have received on
and which have not been circulated generally.

LFP, Jr . :pls
Attachments

.:%u:vumt <!):curt cf tltt 'Jllttitttl' ;%tctft.a
'Dla.alp:ngton, tn. <.q. 20'~Jt,;l
CHAMBERS OF

January 3, 1973

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 71-6356 - Doe v. McMillan

Dear Bill:
I am in agreement with your
memorandum of December 22nd.
Sincerely,

~(_

T.M.

Mr. Justice Douglas
cc:

Conference

/

MEMORANDUM
February 2, 1973

TO:
~~

~:

l'.

,.

',Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

!\•(I

Doe v.

I would appreciate your views as to Mr. Justice White's draft,
circulated only to four of us on January 29 .
.~···~

As he aclmowledges, it is not entirely satisfactory.

~

I have a

~ ~-t;.\.1

" reluctance to hang a potential liability on the Public Printer and the
~·

'

',,:~;.?

Superintendent of Documents when they are not the real culprits, and
when -as a practical matter - it is impossible for either of them to
::r;

"'l.l'~

.

"'~'~--

.....~' '

·~;

•

exercise an intel,ligent, jud~ent ·with respect to the thousands of documents
they are

'

'

•

·.J'"

requested to print each year. '

;i,

'i'

'

MEMORANDUM

"''ll'

Mr. William C. Kelly, Jr.
Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
' Re: No. 71-6356 Doe v.

~·~.~!

, have now reviewed your three memos,

~''' I

which have contributed

significantly to my education although I remain uncertain both as to the
exact state of the present law and precisely where I am willing to go
this case. ·
•

~

, The purpose of this memo is to summarize, in conclusory terms,

~

"
'i ,.

my understanding of a possible position which you think has some merit.
The position would incorporate the following points, although not
necessarily in the order stated;

~ ~

and nonlegislative. :

\1;

2. Members of Congress and their aides (employees) are
protected by the privilege of the Speech and Debate Clause from all
~

consequences of the legislative act of publication where this is an integral
part of the "deliberative and communicative processes" within the Congress.
3. Republication for the purpose of general public dissemination
whether privately or by the Public Printer pursuant to congressional or
committee authorization, is not a part of the legislative process.

",

'(.:J.:.

2.
\'

"!'

4. The type of republication specified in 3 above would not be
privileged as against the assertion of a private right of action where the
complainant asserts either deprivation of a constitutional right or a
personal injury. !
·-.1 ,1~

5. We would leave open, as not being before the Court, the question '
whether such republication would be privileged as against Executive
Branch action seeking imposition of criminal penalties, compelling ,
F c>J.I
l·

. >. ,('' testimony before a grand jury,
.

-!!,,, ~

or seeking injunctive relief. (I am aware,

'

~:1'£:

Bill, that you would like to draw a line between private rights and Executive
conduct, but perhaps we should go no further than making it clear that this
is a different question).
6. There is no privilege, under Gravel, for republication by an
individual member of Congress whether it be through private or government
printing office channels. "

It,,

7. The Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents, when '
acting upon instructions from the Congress or one of its Committees, are
in the same posture as an employee (or aide) of a member or a Committee.
-

(Bill: I am not sure this is your thought, but so understand it). ' · ~
8. If the foregoing points are sound, Complainants in this case
may assert a cause of action against both the members of Congress and
the Printer and the Superintendent of Documents with respect to

~;

t''

,_;:

3.

process.
9. The relief sought by Complainants includes:
(ii) recall and excision; and (iii) compensatory and punitive damages.
y

"""

Although the CA found that injunctive relief was not an issue because of
assurances of no further republication, no evidence was taken. Justice
White apparently accepts the view that injunctive relief is out of the
case, and would remand to determine whether the Printer and Superintendent
may be held liable for damages. Bill Kelly suggests a remand, leaving
open for further consideration by the lower courtsof all categories of
requested relief.

Additional Comment:
, As I read BJll' s memoranda, he would allow a private action
"'

against both members and employees even for duly authorized republication. Although perhaps not controlling, what about Kilbourn and Powell v. ,
,

McCormick? In the former, a private person was arrested and detained

,,

,(i

~~-

for 45 days when the House held him in contempt. Invoking their privilege,
members of the House were dismissed from the suit, which was allowed
to proceed against the Sergeant at Arms. It can be argued that the
citation for contempt was clearly a legislative act, whereas as republication
by the Public Printer for public dissemination (rather than congressional ,. ,,

' 'I!

4.
use) is not a legislative act. Nevertheless, we would certainly be

,K;

venturing into "stormy seas" -to put it mildly - if we held that members
of Congress were liable personally for damages for the republication

"·":ia nd dissemination of a document pursuant to official CongressiDnal or
Committee actim. Also, what about Sullivan v. New York Times and its
relevance? If Sullivan is available in a libel suit, should there be a

,,,~'

difference if the private action were framed as a constitutional violation
of the right of privacy?
;Let us discuss this perplexing case further ahan early opportunity.

·.

Justice White on the Speech or Debate C~use

T

\\t;K

February 9, 1973
1. The basic notion seems to be a simple one,
that all actions are either legislative or nonlegislative.
2. The class of legislative acts includes speech
on the floor of the House, voting, the conductaing of
hearings, and the preparation of committee reports.
The definition of legislative acts has a strong
geo,graphical flavor--legislative acts must, seemingly,
be done within the walls of Congress.
3, The class of nonlegis8tive acts includes

at

least~rivate

republication of documents,

United States v. Gravel, 408
informat~n

u.s.

(i)

------

606; the gathering of

if done outside the walls of Congress,

Gravel, at 626; the physical or constructively physical
~~)

l~ b~rring of would-be members from the House, Powell v.
@)
McCormack, 395

u.s.

486; the

a~resting

of private

citizens found in comtempt, Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103

-------

u.s.

~)

168; anJ5'dealings with the Executive brcreh,

United States v. Johnson, 383

u.s.

169.

The mere

fact that "Senators generally perform certain acts
in their offidal capacity dees not necessarily make
all such acts legislative in nature", Gravel, at 625.
The real test of a legislative act is whether it is
"an integral part of the deliberative and coJIUllunicative
s

processes by which Member participate1\ in committee
and House proceedings", Gravel, at 625.
4. For the purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause,
there is no difference between a Member and an employee
acting at his direction:

.. -2--

~

"None of this, as we see it, involves distinguishing
between a Senator and his personal aides with
respect to legislative immunity. In Kilbourn"type
situations, both aide and Member should b~ immune
with respect to committee and House action leading
to the illegal resolution. So too in Eastland,
as in this litigation, senatorial aides should
enjoy immunity for helping a Member conduct
committee hearings. On the other hand, no pir ior
casehas held that Members of Congress would be immune
if they executed an invalid resolution by themselves
carrying out an illegal arrest, or if, in order
to secure information for a hearing, themselves
seized the property or invaded the privacy of
a citize~." Gravel, at 621.

-

While the opinion uses "personal aides" in some places
and "employees" in others, it is my understanding
that even ministerial employees are protected when
performing legisaltive acts.

-----

Justice White used

---

Kilbourn, where the employee was a Sergeant-at-Arms,
and Powell, where the employees were a Clerk and Doorkeeper,
as examples to support the propoation that all, from
the Member to the lowliest employee, are to be treated
alike for Speech

~Debate

Clause purposes.

In practice, however, it turns out that the legislative
acts are characteristically performed by

---- - -

Jlllllllllllllr

members and that nonlegislative acts are characteristically
performed by employees.

Thus, in Kilbourn, members

could not be "questioned" for passing a resolution
ordering an illegal arrest, but the Seargeant-at-Arms
could be sued for false arrest; in Powell, members could
not be questioned for decidmng or voting to exclude
Adam Clayton Powell from the House, but the Clerk and

- ... 3--

Rstopped from carrying out the arguably illegal order
to exclude him.

In Dombrowski, Senator Eastland

could not be questioned for ordering a committee's
c:o unsel to conduct an investigation, but the counsel

could be sued for conducting an illegal •

search in

the course of the subsequent investigation.
5. In the present case, all are imamune from suit
for preparing the Committee report, "for referring
the Report that

lllllllllllincluded

the material

to the Speaker of the Housep and for voting for
publication of the report." Draft, at 5.

They are

protected because they were, in the words of Gravel,
"integral parts of the deliberative and communicative
processes by which Member participate in committee and
House proceedings",

Draft, at 6.

Distribution to thel public, on the other hand,

---

is not "an integral part etc."

Therefore, those who

carry out that distribution are not protegcted,
and those persons happen to be the Superintendent of
Documents and thel Public Printer.
the ordering

If

In other words,

of the report and the authorizing of

the report for public distribution are legislative
actso but the distribution in fact is not a legisaltive
act.

~'

Form of Relief in Doe v. McMillan
l\CK

February 10, 1973
This memorandum is addressed to your specific concern
that the Superintendent of Documents and the Public
Printer not be held personally liable in damages.
At the outset, I should mention that Justice White
does not seem to be at all concerned about this, because
he does not think that the petitioner's will have the
proverbial snmvball 's chance in hell on remand.

He

seems to think that petitioners' constitutl:ional
claims(Constantineau--public infamy without due process;
violation of right to privacy) are terribly weak and
that their common law libel action will fail because
the statements in the report are probably true.

For

these reasons, he is not particularly concerned about
the form of relief.

The reason he woted the waay he

did was, I think, that he simply wanted to slap
the hands of Congress for doing such a stupid and insensitive
thi~.

On thet merits of the relief question, three
---------··~--~---

items seem to me to be worth discussing1 1) the
present draft's treatment of relief; 2) the treatment
in prior Speech or Debate Clause cases of damage
claims against ministerial employees; and 3) the
present posture of the case.

I.
The present draft outlines on page 3 the

~rayer

- .. 2.. -

of the complaint,

The prayer sought 1)an injunction

against fultrther distirbution; 2) a re4call of
copies already distrmbuted and excision of the
children's names; and 3) compensatory t and punitive
damages,
At footnote 5 on page four, the draft points out
that the CA "independently found that injunctive relief
would not issue because of assurances from the
federal defendants that no republication or further
distribution of the Report was contemplated,"

On

page 10, the draft repeats the substance of the footnote
and then statesa
But this left the question whether any part of
the previous publication and public disttibution
by respondents other than the Members of Congress
and Committee personnel went beyond the limits of
the legisative immunity provided by the Speech
or Debate Clause,,,,"
Finally, the draft closes with this paragraph:
Of course, like the Court of Appeals, we
indicate nothing as to whether petitioners have
pleaded a good cause of action or whether respondents
have other defenses, cons~itutional or otherwise,
We have dealt only with the threshold question of
immunity." at 16-17.
While of course none of this precludes the lower
courts from issuing injunctions against further distribution,
it basically treatts that question as a closed one.
By implication, the remaining possibilities are
1) recall and excision; and 2) damages,

By reserving

the effect of "other defenses", the draft leaves open

--3--

the question whether the Printer and the Superintendent
might defend anly damage claim by asserting lack of
knowledge or lack of malice.
II.
On the basis of a fairly quick search, I have
discovered only two of this Court's cases which bear

--

directly on the question whether damages may
-.....____.._.,_ ...

---- ---..
......

--_..--..-~--~-·--

levied aga:imt an employee acting under orders
'-----from the! House, In Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra,

---------

the siirgeant-at-Arms of the House arrested and detained
for forty-five days a witness whom the House had
resolution declared to be in contempt.

~y

The

wiat•ness brought a damage action agaisnt the
Members of the House and the

<:5!,..

~geant-at-Arms.

This court upheld the dismissal of tha action as
against the Members, but reversed the dismissal
as against the the

~

~geant-At-Arms,

for further proceedings.

and remanded

The case would seem to

----- -----

stand for the proposition that a claim for damages
~------------·against
a nondiscretionary employee may at least

---- -------------·
Clause grounds.

-- --------

survive a motion to dismiss on Speech or Debate
~-----

In Powellll v. McCormack, supra, Adam Clayton
Powell sued Members of the House and the Clerk and
Doorkeeper for refusing to seat him in the 90th
Congress.

By the time the case reached this

--4--

.
,.

Court, Powell had been seated in thel 91 st Congress,
and it was manifestly too late to issue an injunction
to seat him in the 90th Congress.

The Court

held that the case was not moot, dismissed the
action as against the Members on the ground• that
they were protected by the Speech or Debate Clause,
but remanded the action as against the Clerk and
--------------------~

Doorkeeper, stating:

~----~----

______.,
'

Petitioners seek additional forms of equitable
relief, including mandamus for the release of
petitioner Powell's back pay,

In short, the major issue keeping the case alive
was the issue of Powell's right to back pay.
Justice..._

Stewart,

pointed out that the

I

dissenting,

Sargeant-A~-Arms

was no longer

in possession of funds from which to pay salaries
for the 90th Congress.
Powell is perhaps a less strong peecedent
for leaving open the question of damages than
is Kilbourn, primarily because the method by which
Powell sought to obtain payment was mandamus-if there was no fund which the employees of the House
could tap to pay his back salary, then it would
simply not be :P>aid.

In other words, the employees

of the House would on no
liable.

ac~nt

have been personally

Of course, Powell might have rephrased his

complaint as an action for damages rather than for

--5--

~

mandamus.

Under Kilbourn, he would have surmounted

the difficulty of the absence of funds.
Perh~s

the clearest moral to be drawn from

these cases is not that ministerial employees
may be held for damages when they act withih the
scope of their orde.rs, but simply that the Court
is loathe to deal with subsidiary questions in
a Speech or Debate Clause case.

This may

de~ive

from the expectation that once rights have
been declared and claims of immunity repudiated,
Congress will take the next step to repcir the
damage.

Perhaps, on the other hand, the Court

has recog"i1i'z ed that as a•· pra~tic. a\ matter, the
Congress will appropriate money to reimburse
any ministerial employee found liable in the course
of his delegated responsibilities.
III.
As to the present case, I presently think that
the bewt approach is not to decide whether the
Printer and the Superintendent may be held liable

-----------------·------------

-

for damages. I would, rather, take the edge off
of Justice White's assertion that

the request

for prosp*ective injunctive relief is dead.

The

\

~
~

~

question of what relief is appropriate would thus

~

be left totally unsettled 1 all three p*ossibilities--

~

p~~ctive~njunctive relief, recall and excision, and

.....__/

--6--

damages--would be left open.

I think that there

is justification for leaving open the propriety
of

pros~ective

injunctive relief in the summary nature

of the proceedings bel•ow.

We would not have to

overrule theCA on the point, but could simply
state . . . that the question should not be
settled without an evidaentiary hearing.

This

could, I thi·n k, be done with a light touch.
A final point,

-

There is, perhaps, some danger

in leaving open the possibility of injunctive relief.

-----------------------------------------------

Apart fr>om the affromt to Congress, such an injunction
would be a prior restraint, and while the Court
------~~~------------has
not explored in any detail the raationship of

the

Firs~

Amendment to government publicationand

distribution, that problem lurks in the background.
But agai'np there is no reason to drop the draft 8 s

--------

notation that respondents may have"other defenses,
------~----------------------cc---~
constitutional
or other~wise."

-----

<

/II

/

General Comments
Doe v. McMilltn(Draft opinion of White, J.)
February 10, 1973
\\CK

In two other memos, I have att~ted to delineate
Justice White's view of the Speech or Debate Clause
and to address your concern over holding the
Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents
liable for damages.

In this memo, I will offer

my general comments about the draft opinion.

I.
The greatest danger I see in this opinion is
that it will further weaken the Speech or Detate
clause in contexts other than the present one.
In particular, I am concerned that it may further
weaked the Congress vis-a-vis the Executive.
As the Court stated in United States v. Johnson, 383

u.s.

169,1811
"it is apparent • from the history of the clause ~r~
that the privilege was not born primarily
-----of a desire to avoid private suits • • •
but rather to prevent intimidation by the
executive and accountability before a possibly
hostile judiciary."

My reading of contemporary affairs is that the danger
of intimidation by the executive is far greater
than the danger of interference by the judiciary,
at least inso

as the latter phrase refers not
r·

CJ..I"e /n

1m

orhl!

e.s ~'} ~ C.JI't de r E"Yt:"ce;.f;u e co..,

to criminal trials and grand juries but to private
'suits for the redress of private rights.
In

~ravel,

408

u.s.

606, the Court allowed

fll'b ~

--2--

grand jury inquiry of the Senator's aides regarding
"republication" by a private press, Beacon Press,
a republication which was arranged by a single
Member of Congress,

-·-----

In a footnote( at 626 ,n.l6),

..-- ...--...._

the Court reserved judgment on another questions
We need not address issues that may arise when
Congress or either House, as distinguished from
a single Member, orders the publication and/or
public distirbution of committee hearings,
reports, or other materials."
Gravel, then, on its facts, was limited to •
l)private republication 2) at the instance of a
single member.

On its facts, againtll, it does not

preclude the Congress from getting its message
to the people by 1) public publication

e

and. or

2) at the instance of the Congress as a whole.
It is my understanding, though I am not certain
of this, that the PuQlic Printer gets his marching
orders from Congress as a whole or • from committees
but not from individual members,

In any event,

I think that if possible the Court should leave
open whether an employee of the Congress could be
...........

....-*

............

~

..-z

..........

~

•

called before a grand jury or jubjected to a crim. . .inal
...........

-

trial for distribution beyond the immediate needs

----

of Congress.

Additionally, I would if possible leave

open the question whether at the behest of the Executive
a court could enjoin
a committee report.

dist ~rbution

to the public of

--3-One possible way to do so would
distinguish between mere wrongful or
distribution on the one hand and distribution
which infringes on the constitutional rights of
individuals on the other.

On this analysis,

Members and employees would be absolutely
privileged to distribute to the public through
'~

.

-

the Public Printer insofar as criminal penalties,
grand jury testimony, and injunctions sought by
the executive are concerned, put not

privile~ed

to distribute to the public insofar as actions brought
by private citizens for violations of their
constitutional rights are concerned,
In Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F.Supp. 1183(D.D.C.
1970, plaintiffs sought to enjoin republication of
a list of speaket1 whom the House Committee on
Internal

Secu~ty

"thought

to be subversive.

Relief was granted against the Printer and the
Superintendent on the ground that the republication
infringed on the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights.
Hentoff, then, provides some support for the positi'On

l I suggest.
Another version of the privilege \llUld have it
fall to the side not just when a private individual's constitutinal
rights are violated,) but also when any other of his
rights are violated, whether or not those are constitutional

--4--

ones.

In McGovern v. Martz, 182 F.Supp. 343k(D.D.C. 1960),

the court stated in dictum that republication
merited only a qualified privilege in a libel action.
The privilege is "qualified" in the sense that
a private citizen can recover only if he can show
malice.

The Restatement of Torts 590, commen«t B

(1938) takes the same position and is quoted in
McGovern, 182 F.Supp. at 347.

As the Court stated

in Tenney v. Brandhove,
"This Court has not hesitated to sustain the
rights of private individuals when if found
Congress was acting outside its legiaative
roo." 341 u.s., at 377.
To recapitulate, I would like to see the Court
1

-------republicatio~'"'

distinguish as regards i uthorized public

between situations where the Congress has inflicted

-------------------------------------~-----------iru]ury
on individuals and situations where it has
----------~-

~

not but has simply offended the Executive or the
--------------~--------~
Judiciary. The line might be drawn at the violation

--

~

of constitutional rights or might include as well
violations of the "right not to be libeled" if that
right does not have constitutional dimensions.
The distinction would not have to be drawn
with a heavy hand, but it should at least be made
clear that the case would be wholly different if
the Printer were being prosecuted or called before
a grand jury or throttled by an agency.

lit

!

--5--

I acknowledge that this cuts somewhat against
the grain of Gravel's theme that the Clause
has the same meaning for all persons in all contexts,
but you did not write Gravel and few people seem to
be able to understand it
II.
I am bothered a bit by the invitation(on

"-------------

page 15) to Congress to extend legislative

---_--

- ......--

-------·------'

immunity to the public printer and the superintlendent
of documents.
........_. .... .
White states:
~

In Gravel, p 624, n. 15, Justice

.__ .,/"

"The eourt in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367, 376-377(1951), was equally clear that

'legislative activity' is not all-encompassing,
nor may its limits be established by the
Legislative Branch. 'Legislatures may not of
course acquire power by an unwarranted extension
of privilege, The House of Commons'
claim of power to establish the limits of its
privilege has been little more than a pretense
since Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 3 id. 320."
While the present draft treats official immunity
as something separate from the Speech or Debate
Clause privilege, in the end it finds the two
privileges coextensive. See page 16.

I had thought

that the Court was appalled when Judge Aldrich
in Gravel spoke in terms of a common law privilege
separable from the Speech or Debate Clause.

In

any event, an extension of official immunity, like
an extension of the Speech or Debate elause,
would I think raise considerable if not insurmountable

- .. 6--

constitutional problems.

I would drop the invitation.

III.
In general, as we have discussed, the opinion is
hard to follow.

If, ultimately, you join the

opinion, we can probably suggest two or three
changes to sharpen the discussion.

But I will

not try to suggest them now until you decide
whether you think my approach (I. above) is worth
pursuing.

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. William C. Kelly, Jr.

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

February 19, 1973

Re: No. 71-6356 Doe v. McMillan
I have now reviewed your three memos, which have contributed
significantly to my education although I remain uncertain both as to the
exact state of the present law and precisely where I am willing to go in
this case.
The purpose of this memo is to summarize, in conclusory terms,
my understanding of a possible position which you think has some merit.
The position would incorporate the following points, although not
necessarily in the order stated:
1. Accept White's distinction between action that is legislative
and nonlegislative.
2.

Members of Congress and their aides (employees) are

protected by the privilege of the Speech and Debate Clause from all
consequences of the legislative act of publication where this is an integral
part of the "deliberative and communicative processes" within the Congress.
3. Republication for the purpose of general public dissemination
whether privately or by the Public Printer pursuant to congressional or
committee authorization, is not a part of the legislative process.

2.
4.

The type of republication specified in 3 above would not be

privileged as against the assertion of a private right of action where the
complainant asserts either deprivation of a constitutional right or a
personal injury.
5. We would leave open, as not being before the Court, the question
whether such republication would be privileged as against Executive
Branch action seeking imposition of criminal penalties, compelling
testimony before a grand jury, or seeking injunctive relief. (I am aware,
Bill, that you would like to draw a line between private rights and Executive
conduct, but perhaps we should go no further than making it clear that this
is a different question).
6.

There is no privilege, under Gravel, for republication by an

individual member of Congress whether it be through private or government
printing office channels.
7.

The Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents, when

acting upon instructions from the Congress or one of its Committees, are
in the same posture as an employee (or aide) of a member or a Committee.
(Bill: I am not sure this is your thought, but so understand it).
8. If the foregoing points are sound, Complainants in this case
may assert a cause of action against both the members of Congress and
the Printer and the Superintendent of Documents with respect to

3.
republication to the extent that such was not a part of the legislative
process.
9. The relief sought by Complainants includes: (i) injunction;
(ii) recall and excision; and (iii) compensatory and punitive damages.
Although the CA found that injunctive relief was not an issue because of
assurances of no further republication, no evidence was taken.

Justice

White apparently accepts the view that injunctive relief is out of the
case, and would remand to determine whether the Printer and Superintendent
may be held liable for damages.

Bill Kelly suggests a remand, leaving

open for further consideration by the lower court .of all categories of
requested relief.

*****
Additional Comment:
As I read Bill's memoranda, he would allow a private action
against both members and employees even for duly authorized republication.

Although perhaps not controlling, what about Kilbourn and Powell v.

McCormick? In the former, a private person was arrested and detained
for 45 days when the House held him in contempt.

Invoking their privilege,

members of the House were dismissed from the suit, which was allowed
to proceed against the Sergeant at Arms. It can be argued that the
citation for contempt was clearly a legislative act, whereas as republication
by the Public Printer for public dissemination (rather than congressional

4.
use) is not a legislative act. Nevertheless, we would certainly be
venturing into "stormy seas" - to put it mildly - if we held that members
of Congress were liable personally for damages for the republication
a nd dissemination of a document pursuant to official Congressional or
Committee action. Also, what about Sullivan v. New York Times and its
relevance? If Sullivan is available in a libel suit, should there be a
difference if the private action were framed as a constitutional violation
of the right of privacy?
Let us discuss this perplexing case further at. an early opportunity.
L. F. P., Jr.
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

February 20, 1973

Re:

No. 71-6356 -Doe v. McMillan

Dear Bill:
Because I have gotten absolutely nowhere with what I have circulated in this case,
and because there should be some progress, I
suggest you reassign the matter to someone else
on our side · who might bring us together.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Douglas
Copies to: Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Powell
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Dear Byron:
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Please join me in your opinion in
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Noo 71-6356 - Doe Vo McMillano

Mro Justice White
cc: Mro Justice Brennan
Mro Justice Marshall
Mro Justice Powell
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February 20, 19 73

Re: No. 71-6356 - Doe v. McMillan
Dear Bill:
This refers to Byron's letter of February 20.
My failure to respond to Byron's circulation does not mean that
I think it should be abandoned.
The truth is, I have been giving priority to other things and have
not done the work on this case that I had expected to do. The case is a
most puzzling one for me. I was - and still am - dismayed by the result
in the Court of Appeals which offers no prospect of relief to persons in the
position of these complainants. Yet, I must say that up until now I am not
clear in my own mind as to a principled basis for granting relief consistent
with our prior decisions.
I may end up agreeing that Byron has the best answer. Certainly
I have no better answer. I see no great harm in allowing this case to stay
on the "back burner" for a while longer. It is even possible, I suppose, that
the Congress itself might grant some of the requested relief.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Douglas
LFP, Jr. :psf
cc: Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice White

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. William C. Kelly, Jr.

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
~~

·7,.;

ii ...

DATE:

February 27, 1973

'i.t

.~

l>:,

'i>'Jl

'!l 1~1~~

Re: No. 71-6356 Doe v. McMillan

" Now that Justice White has dirculated a draft opinion for the
Court, I would prefer not to come out with a competing opinion. '
' Please explore two possibilities: ( i) an opinion concurring in
Justice White's opinion, but adding my own gloss to it for purposes of
clarification; or (ii) suggest specific changes in his opinion which might
make it a little more understandable. :~·'
I am not entirely satisfied with any result so far discussed either
by you and me (on the basis of your memos), or in the White and Douglas>'
,{i

opinions. Least of all I am dissatisfied with the result of the Court of
.,•.;;.: t'i~ ' '·'·•''

Appeals of the District of Columbia. There may be some middle ground
'''>~#:·'

between Justice White's conclusion and that which you have been inclined
to favor .
•1;.:

~u.prttnc ~curt
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CHAMBERS OF"

February 27, 1973

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 71-6356 - Doe v. McMillan

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,ff
1 I.

L-....__

.M.

Mr. Justice Douglas
cc:

Conference

To: The Chief' Justice

r· '7

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
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J ustice
Justice
Justi ce
Justice
Justice
Justice
Jt1sti ce

Douglas
Brennan
St ewart
Mar shall
Blackmun
Powe ll
Rehnquist

Fr om : White, J.
2nd DRAFT

Ci r culated: _____

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ecircula ted: 2
No. 71-6356
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Apv.
peals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.
John L. McMillan et al.
John Doe et al,
Petitioners,

[February -,

1~73]
I

MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case concerns the scope of congressional immunity
under the Speech and Debate Clause of the United States
Constitution, Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, as well as the reach of
official immunity, see Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564
(1959), particularly in the legislative context, see Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951).
By resolution adopted February 5, 1969, H. R. Rep. No.
76, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong Rec. 2784, the House
of Representatives authorized the Committee on the District of Columbia or its subcommittee "to conduct a full
and complete investigation and study of ... the organization, management, operation, and administration" of
any department or agency of the government of the
District of Columbia or of any independent agency or
instrumentality of government operating solely in the
District of Columbia. The committee was given subpoena power and was directed to "report to the House
as soon as practicable ... the results of its investigation and study together with such recommendations as
it deems advisable." On December 8, 1970, a Special
Select Subcommittee of the Committee on the District
of Columbia submitted to the Speaker of the House a

.::... "-f_~_z.L
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report, H. R. Rep. No. 91-1681, 91st Cong., 2cl Sess.
(1970), represented to be a summary of the Subcommittee's investigation and hearings devoted to the public school system of the District of Columbia. On the
same day, the report was referred to the Committee of
the Whole House on the State of the Union and was
ordered printed. 116 Cong. Rec. H 11347. Thereafter,
the report was pripted and distributed by the Government Printing Office pursuant to 44 U. S. C. ~~ 501 and
701.
The 450-page report included among its supporting
data some 45 pages that are the gravamen of petitioners'
suit. Included in the pertinent pages were copies
absence sheets. lists of absentees, copies of test papers,
and documents relating to disciplinary problems of certain specifically-named students.' The report stated
that these materials \vere included to "give a realistic
vie,y" of a troubled school and "the lack of administrative efforts to rectify the multitudinous problems there,"
to show the level of reading ability of seventh graders
who were given a fifth-grade history test, and to illustrate suspension and clisci:plinary problems."
On January 8, 1971, petitioners, under pseudonyms,
brought an action in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia on behalf of themselves, their
children, and all other children and parents similarly
situated. The named defendants were ( 1) the Chair-

of1

Thr Court of Appr:1ls' opinion trrms t hr m:1 trrials ··~omr what
Thr ah~rntrr li~ts nnmrd st uc!Pnt,.: who \H'rr fn'quent
''el:t,.:.,; <"11ltC'r~." Of tho 2!) 1Pst p::qlC'rs published in thr rPport, 21
borr failing gradrs: all imluclrd thr namr ol' thr studrnt bc·ing tf'~trcl.
Thr lrttrr:-;, mrmorancln, and othrr do<"unwnts rrlating to disc·iplinary
problrm:;; clctailrcl rondurt of ~prc ifieall~· n:mwd ~tudrnt:;. Some of
t hr dr,·i:mt conduct clrseribPcl inYolYrcl sc•xual prn·er,ion :1 nd c-riminal Yiola t io11s.
" ThC' informa1ion waH obt:1inpcl ,·oluntnril~· from Distriet of Columbia srhool pPrRonnd by Committrr ill\ · r~ti~ator:-;.
1

drro!ol::ttor~· ."

/
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man and Members of the House Committee on the District of Columbia; (2) the Clerk. Staff Director, alld
Counsel of the Committee; (3) a consultant and an investigator for the Committee; (4) the Superintendent
of Documents ancl the Publlc Printer; ( 5) the President and members of the Board of Education of the
District of Colmnbia; (6) the Rupcrintcnclcnt of Public
Rchools of the District of Columbia; (7) the principal of
Jefferson High School and one of the teachers at that
school; and (8) the United States of America.
Petitioners alleged that, by disclosing, disseminating,
ancl publishing the information contained in the report,
the defendants had violated the petitioners' and their
children's statutory, constitutional. and common law
rights to privacy and that such publication had caused
and would cause grave damage to the children's mental
and physical health and to their reputations, ood names,
and future careers. Petitioners also alleged various violations OflOcal law. Petitioners further charged that
"unless restrained, defendants will continue to distribute
and publish information concerning plaintiffs, their
. children and other students." The complaint prayed for
!QJ an order enjoining the c.lefcndan ts from further J publication, dissemination, and distribution of ar~_,rcport containing the objectionable material and fm~n order recalling the reports to the extent practicable, and deleting
the objectionable material fron~ report already in
circulation. Petitioners also ask~r compensatory and
punitive damages."
The District Court, after a hearing on motions for
a temporary restraining order and for an order against
"The prnyer nlso inrludccl a req11e~t for an injunction prohibiting
future cli~rlosure of "confidential information" nnd requiriug the Dist rirt of Columbia School Bonrcl "to pstabli~h rule~ nnd regulations
rrgnrding thr ronfidrntiality of srhool paper~ nnd the right of pri1·ary
of students in the ~rhools of the District of Columbia."
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further distribution of the report, dismissed tho action
agaillst thE' individual clefenda!lts on tho grou11d that
the conduct complained of was absolutely privileged. 1
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. Without
determining whether tho complaint stated a cause of
action under the Constitution or any applicable law, the
majority held that the Members of Congress, the Committee staff employees, and the Public Printer and Superintendent of Documents were immune from the liability
asserted against them because of the Speech and Debate
Clause and that the official immunity doctrine recognized
in Barr v. 111at teo barred any liability on the part of the
District of Columbia officials as well as the legislative
ernployees.fi We granted certiorari, 408 U. S. 922.
I

To "prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a possible hostile judiciary," GravelY. United States, 408 U.S. 606,617 (1972),
Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution provides that "for
any Speech or Debate in either House, they [Members
of Congress] shall not be questioned in any other Place."
"The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to ~
a co-equal branch of the government-wide
freedom of speech, debate, and deliberation without
The District Court al~o di~missed the suit again~;t the United
States for failure to exhaust administratiYe remedies. 28 U. S. C.
§ 2675 (a). That ruling il:l not challenged here.
5
The Court of AppealH nl~;o independently found thnt injunctiverelief would not issue because of assurances from the frurral del'rndants that no re ublicatiou or further distributwn o t 1r Report was
co~d. With respect to pet1 wners' reque~t for injunctive
relief against the District of Columbia ofiicinls, the Court found that,
because of the adoption of new policies concerning confidential information, "there is no substnntial threat of future injury to npprllants."
4

I
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intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch.
It thus protects Members against prosecutions that
directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative
process." Gravel v. United States, supra, at 616.
The Speech and Debate Clause has been read "broadly
to effectuate its purposes," United States v. J ohnsonr
383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966); Gravel v. United States, supra,
at 624, and includes within its protections anything·
"generally done il;-a session of the House by one of its
members in relation to tl1e business before it." Kilbourn
Y. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 204 (1880); United States
Y. Johnson, supra, at 179; Gravel v. United States, supra,
at 624. Thus "yog1~g by Members and committee reports are protected" and "a Member's conduct at legislative committee hearings, although subject to judicial
review ii1 various circumstances, as is legislation itself,
may not be made the basis for a civil or criminal judgmen_!, against a Member b~e that conduct is \vithin
the 'sphere of legitimate legislative activity.' " Ibid.
Without belaboring the matter further, it is plain to
\!;S that ~mplaint in this case was barred by the
S eech or Debate Clause insofar as it sought relief from
the Congr~-committee members, rom the committee staff, from the consultant, or from the investigator,
for introdu~at committee heanngs tli.at
identified particular individuals, for referring the Report
that included the material to the Speaker of the House,
a;}d"Tor ting for publication 'of the report. Doubtless,
also, a QUblishe report may, wit out losing Speech and
Debate Clause protection, be distributed to and used
fo_r le~tive purposes by Members of Congress, congressional committees, and institutional or individual
legislative functionaries. At least in these respects, the
actions upon which petitioners sought to predicate lia-
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bility were "legislative acts," Gravel v. United Slates,
supra, at 618, and, as such, were immune from suit."
Petitioners argue that including in the record of the
hearings m;d - in the Report itself materials describing
particular conauct onthe part of identified children was
actionable because unnecessary and irrelevant to any
legislative purpose. Cases in this Court, however, from
Kilbourn to Gravel pretermit ,the irqposition of liability
on any such theory. Congressmen and their aides are
immune from liability for their actions within the "legislative sphere," id., at 624-625, even though their conduct, if performed in other than legislative contexts,
would in itself be unconstitutional or otherwise contrary
to criminal or civil statutes. Although we might disagree
with the Committee as to whether it was necessary or
even remotely useful to include the names of individual
children in the evidence submitted to the Committee and
in the Committee Report, \Ye have no authority to
oversee the judgment of the Committee in this respect
or to impose liability on them if we disagree with their
legislative judgment. The acts of authorizing an investigation pursuant to which the subject materials were
gathered, the acts of holding hearings where the materiaJs \vere presented, preparing a Report where they
were reproduced, and authorizing the publication and
distribution of that Report where "all integral part[s]
of the deliberative and communicative processes by which
Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or
rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other
matters which the Constitution places within the juris"In Grauel, we held
not onl~· to a l\1rmber
of the IMtrr would be
1 he !vlembrr himsrlf."

that ·'the 8perch and Debate C lau:.;e applirs
but also to hi~ nick~ insofnr a:-; the conduct
n protected legi~lativl' nrt if prrformPd by
Gravel "· United State:;, -lOS U. 8., nt fllR.
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diction of either House.' ' !d., at 625. As such, the acts
'"ere protected by the Speech and Debate Clause.
Our cases make perfectly apparent, however, that
ev.gr~thin_g a Member of Congress may rc~ly doTs
not a legislative act within the protection of the Speech
or Debate l1aul"e. "rTJhe Clause has not been extended beyond the legislative sphere," and "[l] egislative
acts are not all-encompassing." !d., at 624-625. Members of Congress may frequently be in touch with and
seek to influence the Executive Branch of Government,
but this conduct "though generally done, is not protected legislative activity." I d., at 625; United Slates v.
Johnson, supra. Nor docs the Speech and Debate Clause
protect a private republication of documents introduced
and made public at a. committee hearing, although the
hearing was unquestionably part of the legislative process. Gravel v. United Stales, supra.
The proper scope of our inquiry, therefore, is whether
1mblic distributions of allegedly actionable material are
l~gislative acts~tected by the Speech and Deb~
Clause when, the distributions arc authori7.cd by CongrcsR. The respondent insists that such public distributions arc protcc.ted, that the Clause immuni7.es not only
publication for the information and use of Members in
the performance of their legislative duties but also must
be held to protect ''publications to the public through
the facilities of Congress." Public dissemination, it is
argued, will serve "the important legislative function of
informing the public concerning matters pending before
Congress .... " Brief for Legislative Respondents, p. 27.
We do not doubt the importance of informing the
public about the business of Congress. However, the
question remains whether the act of doing so, simply
because authorized by Congress, must always be considered "an integral part of the deliberative and com-
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municative processes by which Members participate in
committee and House proceedings" with respect to legislative or other matters before the House. Gravel v.
United States, supra, at 625. A Member of Congress
may not with impunity publish a libel from the speaker's
stand in his home district, and clearly the Speech and
Debate Clause 'vould not protect such an act even though
the libel was read from an official committee report. 7
The reason is that republishing a libel under such circumstances is not an essential part of the legislative process and is not part of that deliberative process "by 'vhich
members participate in committee and House proceedings." Ibid. By the same token, others, such as the
Superintendent of Documents or the Public Printer or
legislative personnel, who participate in distributions of
actionable material beyond ~asonable bounds of the
legislative task, enjoy no Speech and Debate Clause
immunity.
Members of Congress are themselves immune for ordering or vOting for a publica lon gomg be oncl the reasonable requirements of the legislative function, Kilbourn
v. Thompson, supra, but the Speech and Debate Clause
no more insulates legis1ative functionaries carrying out
such nonlegislative directives than it protected the sergeant-at-arms in Kilbourn v. Thompson when, at the
direction of the House, he made an arrest that the courts
subsequently found to be "without authority." !d., at
200. The Clause does not protect "criminal conduct
threatening the security of the person or property of
others, whether performed at the direction of the Senator
in preparation for or in execution of a legislative act or
7
The republication of a libel, in circumstances whrre 1hr initial
publication is privileged, is generally unprotected. Srr gcnernlly
Harper & James, The Law of Torts, § 5.18 (1956); Pro~::;cr, TortR,
766-769 (4th ed. 1971). See al·o Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S.,
at 622-627.
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done without his knowledge or direction." Gravel v.
United States, supra, at 622. Neither, we think, does it
immunize those "·ho publish and distribute otherwise
actionable materials beyond the reasonable requirements
of the legislative function.
Thus we cannot accept the prol2_osition that in order
to jJerform- itslegislativeful1clion Congress not only must
at times ~lsidcr ~onable material but also
must be free to disseminate it to the public at large, no·
matter ho'v injurious to private reputation that m-;.:terial might be. We cannot believe that the purpose of
th~to prevent intimidation of legislators by
the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary," id., at 617-will suffer in the slightest if
it is held that those who, at the direction of Congress
or otherwise, distribute actionable material to the pubI. _
lie at large have no ~utomatic immunity m;~ -fv
Speech and Debate Clause but must respond_,.\ w the
~
extent that others must respond in light of the Constitution and ap Jlicable laws. To hold otherwise would
e to invite gratuitous injurY, · for little if any public
purpose~ We are unwilling to sanction such a result, at
least absent more compelling evidence that, in order to
perform its legislative function , Congress must not only
inform the public about the fundamentals of its business
but also must' pweli:sl¥ d!strib.uteA/~B'PrH5rti~ materials
otherwise actionable under local law. • .
That the Speech and Debate Clause h~s finite li!nits is
important for present purposes. The complaint before
us alleges that the respondents caused the committee
report "to be distributed to the public," that "distribution of the report continues to the present," and that
"unless restrained, defendants will continue to distribute
and publish" damaging information about petitioners and
their children. It does not expressly appear from the
com.plaint, nor is it contended in this Court, that either

-

J-~
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tho Members of Congress or the Committee personnel did
anything more than conduct tho hearings, prepare the
Report, and authorize its publication. As we have stated,
such acts by those respondents are protected by tho
Speech and Debate Clause and may not serve as a
predicate for a suit. The complaint was therefore
properly dismissed as to these respondents. Other respondents, however, are alleged to have carried out a
public distribution and to be ready to continue such
dissemination.
In response to those latter allegations, the Court of Appeals, after receiving sufficient assurances from the respondents that they had no intention of seeking a republication or carrying out further distribution of the report,
concluded that thoro was no basis for injunctive relief.
But this loft the question whether any part of the previous p{]'EJicatwn and pt1blic diS'ti1.bution by respo1-Kients
ohler than the Members of Congress and Committee personnel went beyond tho limits of the legislative immunity
provided by the Speech and Debate Clause of tho Constitution. Until that question was resolved, the complaint should not have boon dismissed on threshold immunity grounds) unless tho Court of Appeals was correct
in ruling that the action against the other respondents
was foreclosed by the doctrine of official immunity, a
question to which '"o now turn.
II
The official immunity doctrine, which "has in large
part been of judicial making." )3arr v. Matteo, 360 U. S.
564, 569 (1959), confers immunity on government officials of suitable ran for the reason that "officials of
govcmment should be free to exorcise their dutiE>s unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts
done in the course of those duties-suits ·which would
consume time and energies which would otherwise be
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devoted to governmental service and the threat of which
might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of Government." I d., at
571.s The official immunity doctrine seeks to reconcile
two important considerations"[O]n the one hand, the protection of the individual
citizens against pecuniary damage caused by oppressive or malicious action on the part of officials of
the Federal Government; and on the other, the protection of the public interest by shielding responsible
governmental officers against the harassment and
inevitable hazards of vindictive or ill-founded damage suits brought on account of action taken in the
exercise of their official responsibilities." I d., at 565.

In the Barr case, the Court reaffirmed existing immunity law but made it clear that the immunity conferred
might not be the same for all officials for all purposes.
!d., at 573; see also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S., at
378; Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82, 85 (1967).
Judges. like executive officers with discretionary functions, have been held absolutely immune regardless of
their motive or good faith. Barr v. Matteo, supra, at
569; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-555 (1967). But
policemen and like officials apparently enjoy a more
limited privilege. I d., at 555-558. Also, the Court determined in Barr that the scope of immunity from
defamation suits should be determined by the relation
of the publication complained of to the duties entrusted
to the officer. Barr v. Matteo, supra, at 573-574; see also
the companion case, Howard v. Lyons, 360 U. S. 593,
597-598 ( 1959). The scope of immunity has always
~Both brforr and aftrr Ba,T. official immunity has been held applicable to officials of the Lrgislati,·e Branch. Sec 'Tenney Y. Brandhove. 3.J.1 U. S. 307 (1951); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. SZ

( 1907).
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been tied to the "scope of authority." W heeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647, 651 (1963). In the legislative
context, for instance, " [ t] his Court has not hesitated
to sustain the rights of private individuals when it found
Congress was acting outside its legislative role." Tenney v. Bran.dhove, supra, at 377. Thus, we have recognized "the immunity of legislators for acts within the
legislative role," Pierson v. Ray, supra, at 554 ( 1967),
but have carefully confined that immunity to protect
only acts within "the sphere of legitimate legislative
activity." Tenney v. Brandhove, supra., at 376.
Because the Court has not fashioned a fixed, invariable
rule of immunity but has advised a discerning inquiry
into whether the contributions of immunity to effective
government in particular contexts outweighs the perhaps
recurring harm to individual citizens, there is no readymade answer as to whether the remaining federal respo~-the Public Printer and the Superil1tendent of
Documents-should be accorded absolute immunity in
this gg.s.e. Of course, to tlie extenfthat they serve legislative functions the performance of which would be immune conduct if done by congressmen, these officials
enjoy the protection of the Speech and Debate Clause.
Ol}r inQ.1liry here, however, is whether, if they participate
in publication and distributiOn beyond the legislative
sphere,a:ncfthus beyond the protection of the Speech and
Dei);1e Clause, they a;; nevertneless protected by the
doctrme of official1mmunitY." Our start1ng pomt is at
least a rrlliiimum fa.nuTiarity with their functions and
duties.
The statutes of the United States create the office of
Public Printer to manage and supervise the Government
Printing Office, which, with certain exceptions, is the authorized printer for the various branches of the Federal
Government. 44 U. S. C. § 301. "Printing and binding may be done at the Government Printing Office only

--

----

,
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when authorized by law." § 501. The Public Printer
is authorized to do printing for Congress, §§ 701-741,
901-910, as well as for the Executive and Judicial
Branches of Government, §§ 1101-1123. The Public
Printer is authorized to appoint the Superintendent of
Documents with duties concerning the distribution and
sale of documents. §§ 1701-1722.
Under the applicable statutes, when either House of
Congress orders a document printed. the Printer is to
print the "usual number" unless a greater number is
ordered. § 701. The "usual number" is 1,682, to be
divided between bound and unbound copies and distributed to named officers or offices of the House and
Senate, to the Library of Congress, and to the Superin-tendent of Documents for further distribution "to the
State libraries and designated depositories." lbid. 0
There are also statutory provisions for the printing of
extra copies, § 702, bills and resolutions, § 706- 708, public
and private laws, postal conventions, and treaties, §§ 709712, journals, § 713, the Congressional Directory, § 721722, memorial addresses, § 723-724, the Statutes at Large,
§ 728- 729. Section 733 provides that "[t]he PublicPrinter on order of a Member of Congress, on prepayment of costs, may reprint documents and reports of
committees together with the evidence papers submitted,
or any part ordered printed by the Congress."
With respect to printing for the Executive and Judicial
Branches, it is provided that "a head of an executive·
department ... may not cause to be printed, and the
Public Printer may not print, a document or matter
unless it is authorized by law and necessary to the public
business." § 1102 (a) . The executive departments and

°F or the au Lhoriza lion t o supply Huffi rient copies for ~u c h <.liHtribut ion ~ce § 73 . The Public Printer is abo required to f urni ~ h the
Department of State with 20 copies of all con g re~s ional documents
and rep orts. 44 U. S. C. § 715.

71-6356-0PINION
14

DOE v. JV[cMILLAN

the courts are to requisition printing by certifying that
it is "necessary for the public service." § 1103.
The Superintendent of Documents has charge of the
distribution of all public documents except those printed
for use of the executive departments, "which shall be
delivered to the departments," and for either House of
Congress, "which shall be delivered to the Senate Service
Department and House of Representa.tives Publications
Distribution Service." § 1702. He is thus in charge of
the public sale and distribution of documents. The Public Printer is instructed to "print additional copies of a
Government publication, not confidential in character,
required for sale to the public by the Superintendent of
Documents," subject to regulation by the Joint Committee on Printing. ~ 1705.
It is apparent that under this statutory framework,
the printing of documents and their general distribution
to the public would be "within the outer perimeter" of
the statutory duties of the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents. Barr v. Mateo, supra, at 575.
Thus, if official immunity e utomafiCafi'Y; l:l_!;taches to any
conduct~ expressly or implieoly authorized by law, the
C'Ourt o! Appeals correctly dismissed the cornplaint
against these officials. This, however, is not the governing rule.
"-Tl1e duties of the Public Printer and his appointee, the
Superintendent of Documents, are to print, handle. distribute, and sell government documents. The Government Printing Office acts as a service organization for
the branches of the Government. What it prints is produced elsewhere and is printed and distributed at the·
direction of the Congress; the departments, the inde11endent agencies and offices, or the Judicial Branch of the·
Government. The Public Printer and Superintendent
of Documents exercise discretion only with respect to
estimating the demand for particular documents and ad-
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justing the supply accordingly. The existence of a. Public Printer makes it unnecessary for every government
agency and office to have a printer of its own. The Printing Office is independently created and manned and
imbued with its own statutory duties; but, we do not
think that its independent establishment carries with it
an independent immunity. Rather, the Printing Office
is immune from suit when it prints for an executive department for example, only to the extent that it would
be if it were part of the department itself or, in other
words, to the extent that the department head himself
would be immune if he ran his own printing press and
distributed his own documents. To hold otherwise would
mean that an executive department could acquire immunity for non-immune materials merely by presenting
the proper certificate to the Public Printer, who would
then have the duty to print the material. Under such a
holdillg, the department would have a seemingly foolproof method for manufacturing immunity for materials
which the court would not otherwise hold immune if not
sufficiently connected with the "official duties" of the
department. Howard v. Lyons, 360 U. S., at § 597.
Congress has conferred no express, statutory immunity
on t e Public Printer or the Superintendent of Documents. Congress has not provided that these officials
should be immune for printing and distributing materials
where those who author the materials would not be.
vV.e thus face no statutory or constitutional problems in l
interpreting this doctrine of "judicial making." Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U. S., at 569. We do, however, write in the
shadow of Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408
U. S. 564 (1972), and Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U. S. 433 (1971), where the Court advised caution
"[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or
integrity is at stake because of what the government is
doing to him .... " /d., at 437. We conclude that, for

I
A

Vt
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the purposes of the judicially fashioned doctrine of immm)ity, the Printer and the Superintendent of Documents are no more free from suit in the case before us
than would be a legislative aide who made copies of the
materials at issue and distributed them to the public at
tl!e direction of his superiors. See Dombrowski v. Eastlana, 387 U.S. 82 (1967). The scope of inquiry becomes
equivalent to the inquiry in the context of the Speech
and Debate Clause, and the answer is the same. The
business of Congress is to legislate; congressmen and
aides are absolutely immune when they are legislating.
But when they act outside the "sphere of legitimate
legislative activity," Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S., at
376, they enjoy no special immunity from local laws protecting the good name or the reputation of the ordinary
citizen.
Because we think the Court of Appeals applied the
immunities of the Speech and Debate Clause and of the
doctrine of official immunity too broadly, we must vacate
its judgment and remand the case for appropriate further proceedings. 10 We are unaware, from this record,
of the extent of the publication and distribution of the
Report which has taken place to date. Thu~ we have
little basis for judging whether the legitimate legislative
needs of Congress, and hence the limits of immunity,
have been exceeded. These matters are for the lower
courts in the first instance.
Of course, like the Court of Appeals, we indicate noth- /
ing as to whether petitioners have pleaded a good cause \
of action or whether respondents have other defenses,
10

With respect to the District of Columbin, respondents, the Court
of Appeals found that they were acting within the Rropc of their
authority under applicable law and, a~ a result, were immune from
suit. We do not disturb the judgment of the Court of Appeal s in
this respect.

·~
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constitutional or otherwise. We have dealt only with
the threshold question of immunity. 11
r
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in
part and affirmed in part, and the case is remanded to
the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
So ordered.

11 We thus have no occasion to consider Art. I, § 5, cl. 3 which
requires that "Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings,
and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as
may in their Judgment require Secrecy . . . "; nor need we deal
with publications of the Judicial Branch and the legal immunities
that may be attached thereto.

Doe v. McMillan, No 71-6a56
hCK

March 5, 1973
I have again reviewed intensively Justice White's
draft opinion in this case.

On last revie'\v, there

were three points which bothered us: 1) the fact that
J. White's analysis would seem to allow the Executive
to stop distribution of materials authorized by the
Congress to be distributed, and would allow the
distributors to be called before a grand jury or prosecuted
for distributing the materials; 2) the scope of relief;
and 3) the blunt dictum suggesting that Congress could
confer immunity from suit on its emp• loyees,
I •

As to point 1, I have coq:cluded that J. White's
broad-gauged analysis so pervades pages 7-10 of the
draft opinion that I cannot "clean it up" for our
purposes without almost totally re- writing it.
The basic problem is the phrase lifted from Gravel,
"an integral part of the deliberative and commu.nnicative
processes by which Members participate in committee
~

and House proceedings",
to

an awkward phrase which seems
.....
lace informing the public wholly outside of the

legislative sphere,
-~

The pervasiveness of this phrase

and this analysis leaves
see it &

ne is to write a separate opinion.

is to satisfy ourwelves wit

-z..

The other

explicitly leaving open

\
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----- ----

in other sorts of suits.
~-

The

re~vation

of the question

would leave open the possibility of abandoning the
Gravel phrase in a later case, although of course
it gains stature every time it is used in a eourt opinion.
Specifically, you might suggest to Justice White
that he substitute

th~ollowin~

for the first sentence
.~

in the second full paragraph on page eight:
"The proper scope of our inquiry, therefore,
is whether the Speech of Debate Clause affords
absolute immunity from privat~ suit to persons
who, witn authoLization from Congress, distribute
materials which allegedly infringe upon the rights
of individuals." - :
And you might suggest that he add the following footnote
after the phrase "applicable laws" in the middle of
the first full paragraph on page nine:

II.

As to scope of relief, I now think that we were
overly concerned with the problem of damages. It
seems to me that the opinion does enough by leaving
open the question"whether respondents have other
defenses, constitutional or otherwise". See pages
sixteen and sev.enteen.
If we wrote a separate opinion, we might state
that the public printer has a"qualified immunity"
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under which he is liable in damages only where
a private person can show malice.

This cannot,

however, be incorporated consistently in White 0 s
draft since, if there is no privilege at all
under any circumstances, there can hardly be
a qualified privilege here.

III.
Finally, we were bothered by the invitation
(on page fifteen) to Congress to confer statutory
immunity on the Public Printer.

I think that

the conferring of such immunity might well raise
serious constitutional problem• s.

Does Congress,

for example, have the co• nstitutional authority
to confer immunity on its Sergeant-At-Arms and
thereby avoid Tennely v. Brandhove.

Iii Congress

does have such authority, it presumably
can make its acts unreviewable by immunizing all
those who carry them out.

I would recommend that

you ask Justice White to delete all of the
first full paragraph on page fifteen up to but not including
the last four words on page fifteren-- "We conclude
that, for".

,ju:pnm:t (!Jou:rt of tqt 'J!lnitt~ j;tattg
~attfri:nghm.1fl.

(!f.

2Ll~~.;t

CHAMBERS 01"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

March 7, 1973

Re: No. 71-6356 - Doe v. McMillan

Dear Bill:
I cannot join the proposed opinion in this case
and will await your dissent with interest.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

Copies to

__ _,__,_...,.,.......,......,........_.,_ ,

th~

Conference

........-:r--....,__,.,..

---------,,.,._.- , . ,,..., .,.._._~----~---~......,...---

.-

March 10, 1973

Re: No. 71-6356 Doe v. McMillan

Dear Byroo:
I have recently bad an opportunity to get tack into the perplexities
of Doe v. MeMUlan, and have reread the clrculaticns. Although I stW
ftnatiie area a real jlDlgle, and cmtfnue to have doulis about any formulation of governing principles that I have yet seen or can myself devise, I
am now prepared to join your opfnlon for the Court.
I do have a feeU.ng that your draft may shut the door a bit too
tightly on the distribution of material for the purpose of "informing the
publJc coocemlng matters pending before Congress." On page 7, you say:
wrhe prq>er scope of our inquiry, therefore, 1s whether
public distributioos ot alleged actiooable material are
legislative acts protected by the Speech or DebUe Clause
when the distributions are authorized by the Congress. "

I assume that some duly authorized publlc distributioo.s may well
be protected tn ctreumstances where there are ratimal reascos for the
public to be informed apeetfteally and directly by the Ccmgress. The text
of your opinion recognizes this. I wander, therefore, whether you might
think it apprqn1ate to express the "scope of our inquiry" in somewhat
more limited terms, for example:
''The proper seq>e of our inquiry, therefore, is whether
the Speech or Debate Clause affords absolute imm\Dlity
from private suit to perscos who, wtth authorizatioo from
Congress, distribute materials whieh alle~ly infringe
upon the rights of individuals. "

This places the focus of inquiry on the immunity from ertvate
suit rather than whether the distribution is a legislative act.
I attach a copy of page 9 of ywr second draft opinion on which
I have noted a couple of suggested, minor changes. You may also wish

to cooslder the possibility of adding a note m that }:age (keyed to the
sentence in the middle of the paragraph ending with the words "applicable
laws", reading substantially as follows:
''We have no occasion in this ease to decide whether or under
what circumstances, the Speech or Debate Clause woold afford
immunity to distributors of allegedly aett<mable materials
from grand jury questic:ming. crbnJnal charges, or a suU by
the executive to restrain dlstributic:m, where Cc:mgress bas
authorized the particular public distributioo.. "
Although I do net Imow the answer (which could tum m the facts of a
particular ease), there may be a significant difference between the right
of private citizens to sue as compared wUh the right of the Executive
Branch to attack some dlstrtbUtlcm which it disapproved. As you point
out, the historic purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause is to ''prevent
intimidation of legislators by the Executive and aceoontabllity before a
possible hostile Judiciary." A private suU for damages or even to
restrain further publication of an unnecessary private libel does not
threaten the independence of the Legislative Branch.

. <
.f

I have been concerned also as to where your opinion leaves the
Public Printer and Superintendent of Documents in terms of pers<mal
liabUtty for doing what they are ordered to do. As a practical matter,
they wm rarely - if ever - be in a posltlm to exercise an independent
judgment as to whether some libelous or <therwise acttooable material
1s tucked away in some document wh.ieh they are directed to print and
distribute by the Congress or me of Us Committees. It seems unfair
to put the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents in a more
vulnerable posltim than that of their ''bosses". You do suggest .. by
implJcatlon- that the Congress might cooter statutory immunity em
these parties, but this procedure might enable Congress ... if it has the
eODStltutlonal authority to do so - to make all of its acts and distributions
tmreViewable by the simple device of immunizing all persoos who carry

them out. I frankly do not lmow the answers to this dilemma, and

l
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perhaps all we can do is write narrowly and await future eases. The
important point in this ease is to record the Court's cmvietion that
there 1s a point beyond which the reputations of private citizens cannot
be smeared with impunity by wide publtc distribution merely because
some congressional committee decides it wishes to "inform the pubHe".
I hope these suggestioos may have some merit.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White

lfp/ss
be: Mr. William C. Kelly, Jr.

f
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CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

March 13, 1973

Re:

No. 71-6356 -Doe v. McMillan

Dear Lewis:
I shall be happy to make the changes you suggest in
the circulating draft opinion in this case.
I see no acceptable way at this time to distinguish
between conduct the Speech or Debate Clause protects from
private suit and that which it protects from criminal
prosecution or other action. In either event, if the conduct is legislative it seems to me that it is immune.
Legislators are protected from suit or liability for
libeling a person on the floor or in committee, for having
the libel printed for legislative use and also for voting
to have it publicly distributed. But the cases, see for
example Kilbourn, distinguish between the legislative
ordering and the doing of the ordered or authorized act
that is otherwise vulnerable under the law. The Clause does
not protect legislators who themselves participate in
ordinary criminal acts. Nor should it, in my view, protect
those who publicly distribute libels beyond the environs of
the legislative process.
It seems to me that there is constitutional basis
for immunity for the Congressional Record and a constitutional and case-law basis for immunizing congressmen and
their staffs when they make public records at committee
hearings and when they later write and circulate committee
reports as in this case. Also, at each of these steps, the
press under prevailing law, has a qualified privilege to
report. I thus see no lack of opportunity for the interested
public to inform itself.
Then why worry about 11 further 11 public distribution?
Hasn't the good or evil been accomplished and why is not
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further publication as immune as the first disclosure in
committee or on the floor? If it is, of course, we should
be on the other side in this case. But libel and privacy
law has been more discriminating than that and has been
able to distinguish the privileged from the later unprivileged publication -- all with an eye to preventing
gratuitous injury with no countervailing return. That a
first publication is privileged or has been sued on and
paid for does not excuse a later one, whether by the same
or a different publisher.
It may be, as you intimate and as I indicated in an
earlier memo, that we are actually accomplishing little in
this decision. But I suppose it is not wholly an advisory
opinion.
I do appreciate your thoughts.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

To: The

Mr.
Mr.
Mr .
Mr .
Mr .
t...-t:.f.
l

Chief Justice
Justice Dougla~
J usti ce Brennan
JusLi. ce Stewart
Just i ce Marshall
Justi ce Blackmun
J usti ce Powell
·, st ice Rehnquist

From: White, J.

3rd DRAFT
Circulated:

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~~circulated : .~ _ /¥ -Z3
No. 71-6356
John Doe et al.,
Petitioners,

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of ApVo
) peals for the District of
John L. McMillan et al.
Columbia Circuit.
[February - , 1973]
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opuuon of the
Court.
This case concerns the scope of congressional immunity
under the Speech and Debate Clause of the United States
Constitution, Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, as well as the reach of
official immunity, see Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564
(1959) , particularly in the legislative context, see Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951).
By resolution adopted February 5, 1969, H. R. Rep. No.
76, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong Rec. 2784, the House
of Representatives authorized the Committee on the District of Columbia or its subcommittee "to conduct a full
and complete investigation and study of . . _ the organization, management, operation, and administration" of
any department or agency of the government of the
District of Columbia or of any independent agency or
instrumentality of government operating solely in the
District of Columbia. The committee was given subpoena power and was directed to "report to the House
as soon as practicable .. . the results of its investigation and study together with such recommendations as
it deems advisable.'' On December 8, 1970, a Special
Select Subcommittee of the Committee on the District
Qf Columbia submitted to the Speaker of the House a.
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report, H. R. Rep. No. 91-1681, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess ..
(1970), represented to be a summary of the Subcom"'
mittee's investigation and hearings devoted to the public school system of the District of Columbia. On the
same day, the report was referred to the Committee of
the Whole House on the State of the Union and was
ordered printed. 116 Cong. Rec. H 11347. Thereafter,
the report was printed and distributed by the Government Printing Office pursuallt to 44 U. S. C. ~§ 501 and
701.
The 450-page report included among its supporting
<;lata some 45 pages that are the gravamen of petitioners'
suit. Included in the pertinent pages were copies of
absence sheets, lists of absentees, copies of test papers,
and documents relating to disciplinary problems of certain specifically-named students. 1 The report stated
that these materials were included to "give a realistic
view" of a troubled school and "the lack of administrative efforts to rectify the multitudinous problems there,"
to show the level of reading ability of seventh graders
who were given a fifth-grade history test, and to illustrate suspension and disciplinary problems."
On January 8, 1971, petitioners, under pseudonyms,
brought an action in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia on behalf of themselves, their
children, and all other children and parents similarly
situated. The named defendants were ( 1) the Chair1 The Court of Appeals' opimou terms the matenal~ "somewhat
(ierogatory." The absentee lio;ts named stud0nts who W<'l'<' frrqu<'nt
"class eutt0rs." Of the 29 teo;t paper::; publishrd in the r<:>port, 21
bore failing gradr~; all includrd th<:> namr of th<:> student being trHt<:>d.
Th<:> l<:>tters, m0moranda, and othrr documrnto; r<:>lating to disciplinary
problems drtailed conduct of sprrifically named students. Som<' of
the deviant conduct cl<:>scrib0d mvolved srxual prrversion and cnmmal violat10ns .
2 Th<:> informat10n was obtamrcl voluntarily from Distnct of Columbia school personnel by Committe<:> mvcstigators
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man and Members of the House Committee on the District of Columbia; (2) the Clerk, Staff Director, and
Counsel of the Committee; (3) a consultant and an investigator for the Committee; ( 4) the Superintendent
of Documents and the Public Printer; ( 5) the President and members of the Board of Education of the
District of Columbia; (6) the Superintendent of Public
Schools of the District of Columbia; ( 7) the principal of
Jefferson High School and one of the teachers at that
school; and (8) the United States of America.
Petitioners alleged that, by disclosing, disseminating,
and publishing the information contained in the report,
the defendants had violated the petitioners' and their
children's statutory, constitutional, and common law
rights to privacy and that such publication had caused
and would cause grave damage to the children's mental
and physical health and to their reputations, good names,
and future careers. Petitioners also alleged various violations of local law. Petitioners further charged that
"unless restrained, defendants will continue to distribute
and publish information concerning plaintiffs, their
children and other students." The complaint prayed for
.a n order enjoining the defendants from further publication, disseminatiou, and distribution of any report containing the objectionable material and for an order recalling the reports to the extent practicable, and deleting
the objectionable material from the report already in
circulation. Petitioners also asked for compensatory and
punitive damages. 3
The District Court, after a hearing on motions for>
a temporary restraining order and for an order against
~ The prayer also Jncludeu a reque:;t for an in.]unrtwn prohibitingfuture disclmmre of ''confidential information" and requiring the District of Columbia School Board "to establish rule:; and regulation!$
regarding the confidentiality of school paprr::; and the right of priYacy
of stndents in tbr schools of the District of Columbia,.

7i-6:3Sfi--OPINiON

4

DOE

11.

McMlLLAN

further distribution of the report, dismissed the actionagainst the individual defendants on the ground that ·
the conduct complain'ed of was absolutely privileged."
A divided pa1iel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. Without
determining whether the complaint stated a cause of
action under the Constitution or any applicable law, the·
majority held that the Members of Congress, the Committee staff employees, and the Public Printer and Superintendent of Documents ·were immune from the liability
asserted against them because of the Speech and Debate
Clause and that the official immunity doctrine recognized
in Barr v. Matteo barred any liability on the part of the
District of ,Columbia officials as well as the legislative·
employees. 5 We granted certiorari, 408 U. S. 922.

I
To "prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a possible hostile judiciary,'' Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 617 (1972),
Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution provides that "for
any Speech or Debate .in either House, they [Members
of Congress] shall not be questioned in any other Place."
"The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to assume a co-equal branch of the government-wide
freedom of speech, debate. and deliberation without
.t The Dititrict Court also di~mi~sed the tiLllt agamst the United
Stateti for failure to exhaust adminitltrative remedie~. 28 U. S. C .
§ 2675 (a) . That ruling is not challenged here.
5 The Court of Appeals also independently found that mJunctJve
relief would not istlue because of ati~urancrs from the federal defendantti that no republication or further distribution of the Heport was
cont!'mplated. "'itl,l resJ>eci, to petitioners' requ('st for injunctive
relid against the District of Columbia officials, the Court found that ,
because of the adoptwn of new polici('s concerning confidential informatiOn, "there i,~ no t-;ub:-;tantml threat of future injury to appellantH .' 1
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intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch.
It thus protects Members against prosecutions that
directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative
process." Gravel v. United States, supra, at 616.
The Speech and Debate Clause has been read "broadly
to effectuate its purposes," United States v. Johnson,
383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966); Gravel v. United States, supra,
at 624, and includes within its protections anything
"generally done in a session of the House by one of its
members in relation to the business before it." Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 204 (1880); United States
v. Johnson, supra, at 179; Gravel v. United States, supra,
a.t 624. Thus "voting by Members and committee reports are protected" and "a Member's conduct at legislative committee hearings, although subject to judicial
review in various circumstances, as is legislation itself,
may not be made the basis for a civil or criminal judgJ1lent against a Member because that conduct is within
the 1Sphere of legitimate legislative activity.' " Ibid.
Without belaboring the matter further, it is plain to ,
us that the complaint in this case was barred by the
Speech or Debate Clause insofar as it sought relief from
the Congressmen-committee members, from the committee staff, from the consultant, or from the investigator,
for introducing material at committee hearings that
identified particular individuals, for referring the Report
that included the material to the Speaker of the House,
~nd for voting for publication of the report. Doubtless,
also, a published report may, without losing Speech and
Debate Clause protection, be distributed to and used
fpr legislative purposes by Members of Congress, congressional committees, and institutional or individual
legislative functionaries. At least in these respects, the
actions upon which petitioners sought to predicate lia-
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bility were "legislative acts," Gravel v. United States,
supra, at 618, and, as such, were immune from suit."
Petitioners argue that including in the record of the
hearings and in the Report itself materials describing
particular conduct on the part of identified children was
actionable because unnecessary and irrelevant to any
legislative purpose. Cases in this Court, however, from
Kilbourn to Gravel pretermit the imposition of liability
on any such theory. Congressmen and their aides are
immune from liability for their actions within the "legislative sphere," id., at 624-625, even though their con0uct, if performed in other than legislative contexts,
would in itself be unconstitutional or otherwise contrary
to criminal or civil statutes. Although we might disagree
with the Committee as to whether it was necessary or
even remotely useful to include the names of individual
children in the evidence submitted to the Committee and
in the Committee Report, we have no authority to
oversee the judgment of the Committee in this respect
or to impose liability on them if we disagree with their
legislative judgment. The acts of authorizing an investigation pursuant to which the subject materials were
gathered, the acts of holding hearings where the materials were presented, preparing a Report where they
were reproduced, and authorizing the publication and
distribution of that Report where "all integral part[s]
of the deliberative and communicative processes by which
Members participate in committee and House proceedmgs with respect to the consideration and passage or
rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other
matters which the Constitution places within the jurisIn Gravel, we held that ''the Srwech and Drbate Clau ~r apjlllrH
not only to a Member but alo:o to hi:s aidrs insofar as the conduct
of the Jattrr would bP a protrcted lPgislativr act if prrformrd by
thr MPmlwr himsrlf" Gravel v United States. 401\ P. S., at (il~ .
11
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diction of either House.'' !d., at 625. As such, the acts·
were protected by the Speech and Debate Clause.
Our cases make perfectly apparent, however, that
everything a Member of Congress may regularly do is
not a legislative act within the protection of the Speech
or Debate Clause. "fT] he Clause has not been extended beyond the legislative sphere," and "[l] egislative
acts are not all-encompassing." Id., at 624-625. Members of Congress may frequently be in touch with and
seek to influence the Executive Branch of Government,
but this conduct "though generally done, is not protected legislative activity." I d., at 625; United States v.
Johnson, supra: Nor does the Speech and Debate Clause
protect a private republication of documents introduced
and made public at a committee hearing, although the
hearing was unquestionably part of the legislative process. Gravel V. United States, supra.
The proper scope of our inquiry, therefore. is whether
the Speech and Debate Clause affords absolute immunity
from private suit to persons who, with authorization from
Congress, distribute materials which allegedly infringe
upon the rights of individuals. The respondent insists
that such public distributions are protected. that the
Clause immunizes not only publication for the information and use of Members in the performance of their
legislative duties but also must be held to protect "publications to the public through the facilities of Congress." Public dissemination, it is argued, will serve "the
important legislative function of informing the public
concerning matters pending before Congress .
...
Brief for Legislative Respondents, p. 27.
We do not doubt the importance of informing the
public about the business of Congress. However, thequestion remains whether the act of doing so, simply
because authorized by Congress, must always be considered "an integral part of the deliberative and com-
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municative processes by which Members partici1)ate in
committee and House proceedings'' with respect to legislative or other matters before the House. Gravel v.
United States, supra/ at 625. A Member of Congress
may not with impunity publish a libel from the speaker's
stand in his home district, and clearly the Speech and
Debate Clause would not protect such an act even though
the libel was read from an official committee report!
The reason is that republishing a libel under such circumstances is not an essential part of the legislative process and is not part of that deliberative process "by which
members participate in committee and House proceedings.'' Ibid. By the same token, others, such as the
Superintendent of Documents or the Public Printer or
legislative personnel, who participate in distributions of
actionable material beyond the reasonable bounds of the
legislative task, enjoy no Speech and Debate Clause
immunity.
Members of Congress are themselves immune for ordering or voting for a publication going beyond the reasonable requirements of the legislative function, Kilbourn
v. Thompson, supra, but the Speech and Debate Clause
no more insulates legislative functionaries carrying out
such nonlegislati ve directives than it protected the sergeant-at-arms in Kilbourn v. Thompson when, at the
direction of the House, he made an arrest that the courts
subsequently found to be "without authority.'' ld., at
200. The Clause does not protect "criminal conduct
threatening the security of the person or property of
others, whether performed at the direction of the Senator
in preparation for or in execution of a legislative act or
7
The rcpublicalio11 of It libel, in circum~tances where t be 111Jt!Hl
publication is privilegeq, is generally unprotected. See generally
Harper & James, The Law of Torts, § 5.18 (1956); Pro~se r , Torti-;,
765-769 (4th ed. 1971) . Set> abo Gravel v. United States, 40R U.S.,.
nt 622-627.
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done without his knowledge or direction." Gravel v.
United States, supra, at 622. Neither, we think, docs it
immunize those who publish and distribute otherwise
actionable materials beyond the reasonable requirements
of the legislative function.
Thus we cannot accept the proposition that in order
to perform its legislative function Congress not only must
at times consider and use actionable material but also
must be free to disseminate it to the public at large, no
matter how injurious to private reputation that material might be. We cannot believe that the purpose of
the Clause-"to prevent intimidation of legislators by
the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary,'' id., at 617- will suffer in the slightest if
it is held that those who, at the direction of Congress
or otherwise, distribute actionable material to the public at large have no automatic immunity under the
Speech and Debate Clause but must respond to private
suits to the extent that others must respond in light of
the Constitution and applicable laws.' To hold otherwise would be to invite gratuitous injury to citizens for
little if any public purpose. We are unwilling to sanction such a result, at least absent more compelling evidence that, in order to perform its legislative function,
Congress must not only inform the public about the
fundamentals of its business but also must distribute }
to the public generally materials otherwise actionable
under local law.
That the Speech and Debate Clause has finite limits is
important for present purposes. The complaint before
" Wr havE' no ocem;ion in thi~ caHP to drcidc whrthrr or undrr what
circumstarrces, tlw SpE'r:>ch or Dehate Clam;r would afford immumty
to d1~tributor~ of aflegrdl~' actionable material~ from grand jury
qurstioning, criminal charges, or a ::mit by the E'xrcutivc to re::;train
~Tistribut ion, whNP Congrr,.:~ ha" a uthonzrd t lw part irular puhlir
di~tribut 1011.
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us alleges that the respondents caused the committee
report "to be distributed to the public," that "distribution of the report continues to the present," and that
"unless restrained, defendants will continue to distribute
and publish" damaging information about petitioners and
their children. It does not expressly appear from the
complaint, nor is it contended in this Court, that either
the Members of Congress or the Committee personnel did
anything more than conduct the hearings, prepare the
Report, and authorize its publication. As we have stated,
such acts by those respondents are protected by the
Speech and Debate Clause and may not serve as a
predicate for a suit. The complaint was therefore
properly dismissed as to these respondents. Other respondents, however, are alleged to have carried out a
public distribution and to be ready to continue such
dissemination.
In response to these latter allegations, the Court of Appeals, after receiving sufficient assurances from the respondents that they had no intention of seeking a republication or carrying out further distribution of the report,
concluded that there was no basis for injunctive relief.
But this left the question whether any part of the previous publication and public distribution by respondents
other than the Members of Congress and Committee personnel went beyond the limits of the legislative immunity
provided by the Speech and Debate Clause of the Con~titution. Until that question was resolved, the complaint should not have been dismissed on threshold immunity grounds, unless the Court of Appeals was correct
in ruling that the action against the other respondents
was foreclosed by t~e doctrine of official immunity, a
question to which we now turn .
If

The official immunity doctrine, which "has in large
part been of judicial making," Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.

l 1
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564, 569 (1959), confers immunity on government offi~
cials of suitable rank for the reason that "officials of
government should be free to exercise their duties unem~
barrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts
done in the course of those duties-suits which would
consume time and energies which would otherwise be
devoted to governmental service and the threat of which
might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of Government." I d., at
57l.u The official immunity doctrine seeks to reconcile
two important considerations" [ 0] n the one hand, the protection of the individual
citizens against pecuniary damage caused by oppressive or malicious action on the part of officials of
the Federal Government; and on the other, the protection of the public interest by shielding responsible
governmental officers against the harassment and
inevitable hazards of vindictive or ill-founded damage suits brought on account of action taken in the
exercise of their official responsibilities." I d. , at 565.
In the Barr case, the Court reaffirmed existing immunity law but made it clear that the immunity conferred
might not be the same for all officials for all purposes.
!d., at 573; see also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S., at
378; Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82, 85 ( 1967).
Judges, like executive officers with discretionary functions, have been held absolutely immune regardless of
their motive or good faith. Barr v. Matteo, supra, at
569; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 553-555 ( 1967). But
policemen and like officials apparently enjoy a more
limited privilege. !d., at 555-558. Also, the Court determined in Barr that the scope of immunity from
H Both brfore and aftrr Barr, official munumty ha::; been hrld applicable to officials of the Legislative Branch . See Tenney v. Brandhove, :341 U. S. 367 (1951) ; Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82
(1967) .
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defamation suits should be determined by the relation
of the publication complained of to the duties entrustecL
to the officer. Barr v. Matteo, supra, at 573-574; see also
the companion case, H award v. Lyons, 360 U. S. 593 1
597-598 (1959). The scope of immunity has always
been tied to the "scope of authority." Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647, 651 (1963). In the legislative
context, for instance, " [ t] his Court has not hesitated
to sustain the rights of private individuals when it found
Congress was acting outside its legislative role." Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, at 377. Thus, we have recognil!led "the immunity of legislators for acts within the
legislative role," Pierson v. Ray, supra, at 554 (1967),
but have carefully confined that immunity to protect
only acts within "the sphere of legitimate legislative
activity." Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, at 376.
Because the Court has not fashioned a fixed, invariable
rule of immunity but has advised a discerning inquiry
into whether the contributions of immunity to effective
government in particular contexts outweighs the perhaps
recurring harm to individual citizens, there is no readymade answer as to whether the remaining federal respondents-the Public Printer and the Superintendent of
Documents-should be accorded absolute immunity in
this case. Of course, to the extent that they serve legislative functions the performance of which would be immune conduct if done by congressmen, these officials
enjoy the protection of the Speech and Debate Clause.
Our inquiry here, however, is whether, if they participate
in publication and distribution beyond the legislative
sphere, and thus beyond the protection of the Speech and
Debate Clause, they are nevertheless protected by the
doctrine of official immunity. Our starting point is at
least a minimum familiarity with their functions and
duties.

{
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The statutes of the United States create the office of
Public Printer to manage and supervise the Government
Printing Office, which, with certain exceptions, is the authorized printer for the various branches of the Federal
Government. 44 U. S. C. § 301. "Printing and bind~
l.ng may be done at the Government Printing Office only
when authorized by law." § 501. The Public Printer
is authorized to do printing for Congress, §§ 701-741,
901-910, as well as for the Executive and Judicial
Branches of Government, §§ 1101-1123. The Public
Printer is authorized to appoint the Superintendent of
Documents with duties concerning the distribution and
sale of documents. §§ 1701-1722.
Under the applicable statutes, when either House of
Congress orders a document printed, the Printer is to
print the "usual number" unless a greater number is
ordered. § 701. The "usual number" is 1,682, to be
divided between bound and unbound copies and distributed to named officers or offices of the House and
Senate, to the Library of Congress, and to the Superintendent of Documents for further distribution "to the
State libraries and designated depositories." !bid."'
There are also statutory provisions for the printing of
extra copies, § 702, bills and resolutions, § 706-708, public
and private laws, postal conventions, and treaties, §§ 709712, journals, § 713, the Congressional Directory, § 721722, memorial addresses, § 723-724, the Statutes at Large,
§ 728-729.
Section 733 provides that " [ t] he Public
Printer on order of a Member of Congress, on prepayment of costs, may reprint documents and reports of
'"For the authorization lo ~upply sufficient copies for ~uch distribution see § 738. The Public Printer is al~o required to furnish the
Department of State with 20 copies of all congressional documents.
and report~ . 44 U. S. C. § 715

71-6:356-0PINtON

14

DOE v. McMILLAN

committees together with the evidence papers submitted~,
or any part ordered printed by the Congress."
With respect to printing for the Executive and Judicial
Branches. it is provided that "a head of an executive
department ... may not cause to be printed, and the
Public Printer may not print, a document or matter
unless it is authorized by law and necessary to the public
business." § 1102 (a). The executive departments and
the courts are to requisition printing by certifying that
it is "necessary for the public service." § 1103.
The Superintendent of Documents has charge of the
distribution of all public documents except those printed
for use of the executive departments, "which shall be
delivered to the departments," and for either House of
Congress, "which shall be delivered to the Senate Service
Department and House of Representatives Publications
Distribution Service.'' § 1702. He is thus in charge of
the public sale and distribution of documents. The Public Printer is instructed to "print additional copies of a
Government publication, not confidential in character,
required for sale to the public by the Superintendent of
Documents," subject to regulation by the Joint Committee on Printing. § 1705.
It is apparent that under th1s statutory framework,
the printing of documents and their general distribution
to the public would be "within the outer perimeter" of
the statutory duties of the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents. Barr v. Mateo, supra, at 575.
·Thus, if official immunity automatically attaches to any
conduct expressly or impliedly authorized by law. the
Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the complaint
against these officials. This, however. is not the governing rule.
The duties of the Public Printer and his appomtee, the
Superintendent of Documents, are to print, handle, distribute, and sell government documents. The Govern-

t
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tnent Printing Office acts as a service organization for
the branches of the Government. What it prints is produced elsewhere and is printed and distributed at the
direction of the Congress, the departments, the independent agencies and offices, or the Judicial Branch of the
Government. The Public Printer and Superintendent
of Documents exercise discretion only with respect to
estimating the demand for particular documents and adjusting the supply accordingly. The existence of a Public Printer makes it unnecessary for every government
agency and office to have a printer of its own. The Printing Office is independently created and manned and
imbued with its own statutory duties; but, we do not
think that its independent establishment carries with it
an independent immunity. Rather, the Printing Office
is immune from suit when it prints for an executive department for example, only to the extent that it would
be if it were part of the department itself or, in other
words, to the extent that the department head himself
would be immune if he ran his own printing press and
distributed his own documents. To hold otherwise would
mean that an executive department could acquire immunity for non-immune materials merely by presenting
the proper certificate to the Public Printer, who would
then have the duty to print the material. Under such a
holding, the department would have a seemingly foolproof method for manufacturing immunity for materials
which the court would not otherwise hold immune if not
sufficiently connected with the "official duties" of the
department. Howard v. Lyons, 360 U. S., at § 597.
Congress has conferred no express, statutory immunity
on the Public Printer or the Superintendent of Documents. Congress has not provided that these officials
should be immune for printing and distributing materials
where those who author the materials would not be.
We thus face no statutory or constitutional problems in
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interpretmg this doctrine of "judicial making. " Barr v,
Matteo, 360 U. S., at 569. We do, however, write in the
shadow of Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408·
U. S. 564 (1972), and Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400'
U. S. 433 (1971), where the Court advised caution
"[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or
integrity is at stake because of what the government is
doing to him . .. ." !d., at 437. We conclude that, for
the purposes of the judicially fashioned doctrine of immunity, the Printer and the Superintendent of Documents are no more free from suit in the case before us
than would be a legislative aide who made copies of the
materials at issue and distributed them to the public at
the direction of his superiors. See Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 ( 1967). The scope of inquiry becomes
equivalent to the inquiry in the context of the Speech
and Debate Clause, and the answer is the same. The
·business of Congress is to legislate; congressmen and
aides are absolutely immune when they are legislating.
But when they act outside the "sphere of legitimate
legislative activity, " Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S., at
376. they enjoy no special immunity from local laws protecting the good name or the reputation of the ordinary
citizen .
Because we think the Court of Appeals applied the
immunities of the Speech and Debate Clause and of the
doctrine of official immunity too broadly, we must vacate
its judgment and remand the case for appropriate further proceedings." We are unaware, from this record,
of the extent of the publication and distribution of the11
With ff'l:>JWct to the District of Columbm rcsponcle11t s, the Court
of Appeals found that they were act ing within the scope of their
authority undPr applicable law and, as a rrsult, wcrP JmmuJJC from
.:mit. We do not disl nrb thP judgment of thP Court of ApJwalH Ill"
t h u:; fPSJWCt .
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Report which has taken place to elate. Thus we have
little basis for judging whether the legitimate legislative
needs of Congress, and hence the limits of immunity,
have been exceeded. These matters are for the lower
courts in the first instance.
Of course, like the Court of Appeals, we indicate nothing as to whether petitioners have pleaded a good cause
of action or whether respondents have other defenses,
constitutional or otherwise. We have dealt only with
the threshold question of immunity.'"
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in
part and affirmed in part, and the case is remanded to
the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion .
So ordered.

r.
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This case concerns the scope of congressional Immunity
under the Speech or Debate Clause of the United 8tates
Constitution, Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, as well as the reach of
official immunity in the legislative context. See Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959 ) : Tenney v. Brandhove,.
341 U. S. 367 (1951)
By resolution adopted February 5, 1969, H. Res. No.
76, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong Rec. 2784, the House
of Representatives authorized the Committee on the District of Columbia or its subcommittee "to conduct a full
and complete investigation and study of . . . the organization , management, operation and administration " of
any department or agency of the government of the
District of Columbia or of any independent agency or
instrumentality of government operating solely within
the District of Columbia. The committee was given subpoena power and was directed to "report to the House
as soon as practicable
the results of its investigation and study together with such recommendations as
it deems advisable." On December 8, 1970, a Special
Select Subcommittee of the Committee on the District
of Columbia ubmitted to the Speaker of th<" Hous a .
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report, H. R. Rep. No. 91-1681, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970), represented to be a summary of the Subcommittee's investigation and hearings devoted to the public school system of the District of Columbia. On the
same day, the report was referred to the Committee of
the Whole House on the State of the Union and was
ordered printed. 116 Cong. Rec. 40311 (1970). Thereafter, the report was printed and distributed by the Government Printing Office pursuant to 44 l. S. C. §~ 501
and 701.
The 450-page report included among its supporting
data some 45 pages that are the gravamen of petitioners'
suit. Included in the pertinent pages were copies of
absence sheets, lists of absentees, copies of test papers,
and documents relating to disciplinary problems of certain specifically-named students. 1 The report stated
that these materials were included to "give a realistic
view" of a troubled school and "the lack of administrative efforts to rectify the multitudinous problems there,"
to show the level of reading ability of seventh graders
who were given a fifth-grade history test, and to illustrate suspension and disciplinary problems.2
On January 8, 1971, petitioners, under pseudonyms,
brought an action in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia on behalf of themselves, their
children, and all other children and parents similarly
situated. The named defendants were (1) the Chair1 The Court of Appeals' opinion termR the materiab "somewhat
derogatory ." The ab~entee lists namrd studrnt::; who were frequent
"class cutter~." Of the 29 test paper:; publi;;hed in the report, 21
bore failing grades ; all included the name of the ::;tudent being tested.
The letters, memoranda, and other documents relating to disciplinary
problems detailed conduct of specifically named ;;tudents. Some of
the deviant conduct described mvolved sexual prrversion and criminal violations.
2 The information was obtamed voluntarily from District of CoJumhia school personnel by Comm1ttee investigators
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:man and members of the House Committee on the District of Columbia; (2) the Clerk, Staff Director, and
Counsel of the Committee; (3) a consultant and an investigator for the Committee; ( 4) the Superintendent
of Documents and the Public Printer; ( 5) the President and members of the Board of Education of the
District of Columbia; (6) the Superintendent of Public
Schools of the District of Columbia; ('7) the principal of
Jefferson High School and one of the teachers at that
school; and (8) the United States of America.
Petition~rs alleged that, by disclosing, disseminating,
and publishing the information contained in the ~eport,
the defendants had violated the petitioners' and their
children's statutory, constitutional. and common law
rights to privacy and that such publication had caused
and would cause grave damage to the children's mental
and physical health and to their reputations, good names,
and future careers. Petitioners also alleged various violations of local law. Petitioners further charged that
"unless restrained, defendants will continue to distribute
and publish information concerning plaintiffs, their
children and other students." The complaint prayed for
an order enjoining the defendants from further publication, dissemination, and distribution of any report containing the objectionable material and for an order recalling the reports to the extent practicable and deleting
the objectionable material from the reports already in
circulation. Petitioners also asked for compensatory and
punitive damages. 8
The District Court, after a hearing on motions for
a temporary restraining order and for an order against
3 The prayer all:lo included a reque~t for an m]unchon prolubitmg
future dil:lclosure of "confidential information" and requiring the District of Columbia School Board "to cstablil:lh rule~; and regulations
regarding the confidentiality of school paper::; a))([ the right of privacy
of studcntl:l in the schooll:l of the District of Columb41. "
·
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further distribution of the report, dismissed the action
against the individual defendants on the ground that
the conduct complained of was absolutely privileged!
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. Without
determining whether the complaint stated a cause of
action under the Constitution or any applicable law, the
majority held that the Members of Congress, the Committee staff employees, and the Public Printer and Superintendent of Documents were immune from the liability
asserted against them because of the Speech or Debate
Clause and that the official immunity doctrine recognized
in Barr v. Matteo, supra, barred any liability on the part
of the District of Columbia officials as well as the legis~
lative employees. ~ We granted certiorari, 408 U. S. 922.

I
To "prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary," Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 617 ( 1972) ,
Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution provides that "for
any Speech or Debate in either House, they [Members
of Congress] shall not be questioned in any other Place."
"The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to assume a co-equal branch of the governmentwide
freedom of speech, debate, and deliberation without
The District Court also dismissed the suit against the United
States for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 28 U S. C.
§ 2675 (a). That ruling is not challenged here.
5 The Court of Appeals also independently found that injunctive
relief would not issue because of assurances from the federal defendants that no republication or further distribution of the Report was
contemplated. With respect to petitioners' request for injunctive
relief against the District of Columbia officials, the Court found that,
because of the adoption of new policies concerning confidential information, "there is no substantial threat of future injury to appellants,"
4
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intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch.
It thus protects Members against prosecutions that
directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative
process." Gravel v. United SLates, supra, at 61()."
The Speech or Debate Clause has been read "broadly
to effectuate its purposes," United States v. Johnson,
383 U. S. 169, 180 (1966); Gravel v. United States, supra,
at 624, and includes within its protections anything
"generally done in a session of the House by one of its
members in relation to the businPss before it." Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 204 (1880); United States
v. Johnson, supra, at 179; Gravel v. United States, supra,
at 624; Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 502 ( 19GD);
United States v. Brewster, 40R P . S. 501. 5ml. 51:2- 513
( 1972).
"A legislative act has consistently been defined as
an act generally done in Congress in relatiou to the
business before it. . . . [ T Jhe Speech or Debat<'
Clause prohibits inquiry only into those things generally said or done in the House or the S(•nate in the
performance of official duties and into thP motivation for those acts." !d., at 51:2.
Thus "voting by Member::; and coimmtteC' r<'ports are
protected" and "a Mcmbcr's conduct at legislative committee hearings. although sub,1ect to .JUdicial review 111
various circumstances. as is legislation itself. may not bc
made thc basis for a civil or criminal judgment agaimt
a Member because that conduct is 1vithin the 'sphere
<~"Our ><pePrh or drbnt<' privilege wa:> drHtgtwd to prC'~rrv<' legt~la
tiV<' md<'JW11cl<'nrr , not ~upremac~·. Our ta:;k, tlwrdon•, t>< to nppl~·
t lw Clau~e in "'uch a way as to insun• the mdepPndenre of t h(• lrgiH!a 1urC' 1\'ithout altPring 1hr l11:>torir balanc<· of the thrPP <'o-l'qual
branrh<'ti of Govrmmrnt.'' United Stc1tl's ,. l3rew8ter. 40X (' ~ . 501 ,
.')Qf' (1972).
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of legitimate legislative aetivity .·" Umvel v. ( ·111/ed
States, supm, at 624.
Without belaboring the matter fmther, it is plain to
us that the complaint in this case was barred by the
Speech or Debate Clause insofar as it sought relief from
the Congressmen-Committe<' member!', from thr commit·
tee staff, from the consultant, or from the investigator,
for introducing material at committee hearings that
identified particular individuals, for referring the Report
that included the material to the Speaker of the House,
and for voting for publication of the report. Doubtless,
also. a published report may. without losing Spc<'ch or
Debate Clause protection, be distributed to and used
for legislative purposes by Members of Congress, congressional committees, and institutional or individual
legislative functionaries. At least in these respects, the
actions upon which petitioners sought to predicate liability were "legislative acts," Gravel v. United States,
supra, at 618. and. as such, wer<' immune from suit.1
Petitioners argue that including in the record of the
hearings and in the Report itself materials describing
particular conduct on the part of identified children was
actionable because unnecessary and irrelevant to any
legislative purpose. Cases in this Court, however, from
Kilbourn to Gravel pretermit the imposition of liability
on any such theory. Congressmen and their aides are
immune from liability for their actions within the "legislative sphere.'' Gravel\' . United Slates, supra, at 624-625.
even though their conduct, if performed in other than
legislative contexts, would in itself be unconstitutional or
otherwise contrary to criminal or civil statutrs. Although we might disagree with the Committee as to
' ln Oravel. ,,.<' hC'ld
not onl~· to a Membrr
of the latter would be
the Member himself."

that "tiH' 8pr<·<"h or Dr batr Cla u ~<· appii<·~
but also to hi ~ mdrs msofar as the conduct
a protected leg i ~l at 1ve act if performed by
Gravel v. United States, 408 U S., at 618.
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whether it was necessary, or even remotely useful. to
include the names of individual children in the evidence
submitted to the Committee and in the Committee
Report, we have no authority to oversee the judgment
of the Committee in this respect or to .impose liability
on them if we disagree with their legislative judgment.
The acts of authorizing · an investig~tiou pursuant to
which the subject materials were g~thered. holding hearings where the materials were presented. preparing a
Report where they were reproduced, and authorizing the
publication and distribution of that Report were all "integral part[s] of the deliberative and communicative
processes by which Members participate in com1pittee
and House proceedings with respect to the consideration
and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with
respect to other matters which the Constitution places
within the jurisdiction of either House." ld., at 62'5.
As such, the acts were protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause.
Our cases make perfectly apparent, however, that
everything a Member of Congress may regularly do is
not a legislative act within the protection of the Speech
or Debate Clause. "[T]he Clause has not been extended beyond the legislative sphere," and "[1] egislative
acts are not all-encompassing." I d., at 624-625." Members of Congress may frequently be in touch with and
seek to influence the Executive Branch of Government,
but this conduct "though generally done, is not pro" "Thr heart of the Claww i~ ~prrch or debate m r1thrr Hou~r
Insofar as t hr Clau ·e i~ con~trurd to rrach other matters, they must
be an integral part of thr drlibrrativr and commun1cat 1vr proce~~e~
by which Members partic1patr m comm1ttre and Housr procerdingt(
with respect to the comnderatwn and pa~sage or rejrction of proposed legislation or with respect to othPr matters wl11Ch thr Con~titution placr~ withm thr jurisdictiOn of r1thrr Uou~('" Gravel v,
United 8tates. 408 () . S.. at t'i21i,
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tected legislative activity." I d., at 625; United States v.
Johnson, supra. Nor does the Speech or Debate Clause
protect a private republication of documents introduced
and made public at a committee hearing, although the
hearing was unquestionably part of the legislative process. Gravel v. United States. supra.''
"It is well known. of course'. that Members of the
Congress engage in many activities other than the
purely legislative activities protectf'd by the 8pecch
or Debate Clause. These include a wide range of
legitimate 'errands' performed for consti tupnts, the>
making of appointments with Government agencies, assistance in securing Government contracts.
preparing so-called 'news letters · to constituents.
news releases, and speeches deli vcred outside Congress. The> range of these related activities has
grown over the years. They arc performed in part
because they have come to be expected by constituents, and because th ey are a means of clcveloping continuing support for future elections.
Although these arc entirely legitimate activities. they
are political in nature rather than legislative . m thP
sense that term has been usee! by the Court 111 prwr
cases. But It has never been seriously contended
that these political matters, however appropriate.
have the protectwn afforded by the ~peech or Debate Clause." United States v. Hretuster, supra, at
51:2

The proper scope of our inquiry, therefore, IS whether
the Speech or Debate Clause affords absolute 1mmumty
from private suit to persons who , w1th authorization from
Congress, distribute materials which allegedly mfringe
" In Gravel we lwld thnt ·· pnvntl' publlcnt10n h~· 8<'nator (;rnvrl
t hrough the cooperation of Beacon Pr<·~~ wn,.; 111 no wn~ · <'""<'nt tal
to tlw dPitheratwn ~ of thr 8ennt<' ... ~OS \T 8 .. :11 ti:25
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upon the rights of individuals. The respondent insists
that such public distributions are protected, that the
Clause immunizes not only publication for the information and use of Members in the performance of their
legislative duties but also must be held to protect "publications to the public through the facilities of Congress.'' Public dissemination, it is argued, will serve "the
important legislative function of informing the public
''
concerning matters pending before Congress .
Brief for Legislative Respondents, p. 27.
We do not doubt the importance of mforming the
public about the business of Congress. However, the
question remains whether the act of doing so, simply
because authorized by Congtess, must always be considered "an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in
committee and House proceer;:lings" with respect to legis~
lative or other matters before the House. Gravel v.
United States, supra, at 625. "] n no case has this Court
ever treated the Clause as protecting all conduct relatiny
to the legislative process. ln every case thus far before
this Court. the Speech or Debate Clause has been limited
to an act which was clearly a part of the legislative process-the due functiOning of the process." United States
v. Brewster, supra, at 515- 516. A Member of Congress
may not with impunity publish a libel from the speaker's
stand in his home district. and clearly the Speech or
Debate Clause would not protect such an act even though
the libel was read from an official committee report."'
The reason is that republishing a libel under such Circumstances is not an essential part of the legislative proc10 The repubhcatiOil of a libel, Ill cJrctun~tallCPH when• the Initwl
publication 1s pnvilegcd, Js generally unprotected. See generally
Harper & James, The Law of Torts, § 5.18 (1956); Prosser, Torts,
766-769 (4th eeL 1971) See also Gravel v Umted States, 40 U S.,
at 622-627.
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ess and is not part of that deliberative process "by which
members participate in committee and House proceedings." Gravel v. United States, supra, at 625. By thr
same token, others. such as the Superintendent of Docu~
ments or the Public Printer or legislative personnel. who
participate in distributiOns of actionable material beyond
the reasonable bounds of the legislative task. rn.ioy no
Speech or Debate ( 'laus<• mLmuntty
Members of Congress are themselves Immune for ordering or voting for a publication going beyond the reasonable requirements of the legislative function, Kilbourn
v. Thompson, supra, but the Speech or Debate Clause
no more insulates legislative functionaries carrying out
such nonlegislative directives thau it protected the sergeant-at-arms in Kilbourn v. Thmnpson when, at the
direction of the House, he made an arrest that the courts
subsequently found to be ''without authority." !d., at
200." :::lee also Powell v . McCormack, 395 C.~., at 504 ;
cf. Dombrowski v . Eastland, 387 F ~ . 8:2 ( 19tl7) Thr
Clause doee not protect "cmnmal conduct threatenlllg
the security of the persou or property of othrrs. whether
performed at thr direction of the Senator tn prrparatw11
for or 111 execution of a legislative act or cion<' ;vithout
his knowledge or directiOn.' ' Gravel v. Unit ed Stales,
supra, at 622. ~either. we tlunk . does 1t unmunizr those
who publish and distribute oth<•rwLsP actionabl<' matenalf'
1 ' " l11 Ktlbottl'll, thP t:3pl'Pch ur Drlmtr Clau,;r Jlrot<'CtC'd Holl>'<
'
:'vlrmber,; wbo bad adoptPd a l'('::;olut ton authonzmg Kilbourn •,
arrp,;j ; that act wa,; clrarl~ · legil"lat tvl' 111 tHit m·<' But t h<· re:::oln t lOll II'H>' HUb.]rrt tO j udtCI!li l'('Vl<'ll' lll~Of <t T' H ~ It H ('Xl'('llt lOll nnping<'d
011 n ctt1zrn '~ nght ,; a~ tt dtd thNP
Thnt tlw Hou ~r could wtth
impumt~ · ordrr an uncon~tituttonnl anP~t afford ed no protrction for
tho>'<' wlto madr tlw nrrP~t " Orotwl I ' Cmterl Statr's. -+0~ !'. ~ ..
nt I)J Jo.. ,

l
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beyond the reasonable requirements of thP legislative'
function.' ~

Thus we cannot accept the proposition that in order
to perform its legislative function Congress not only must
at times consider and use actionable material but also
must be free to disseminate it to the public at large. no
matter how injurious to private reputation that material might be. We cannot believe that the purpose of
the Clause-"to prevent intimidation of legislators by
the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." Gravel v. ('nited Slate:s, supra , at 617;
Powell v. McCormack, supra, at 502; United Stales v.
Johnson, supra, at 181-will suffer in the slightest tf
it is held that those who, at the direction of Congress
or otherwise, distribute actionable material to the public at large have no automatic immunity under the
Speech or Debate Clause but must respond to private
suits to the extent that others must respond in l}ght of
the Constitution and applicable laws.'" To hold other'"Although , nH pointed out by m~ dtH~entut~ Bn•threu , tiH· aet:-:.
of Senator Gravel wrrr not orderrd or authorizPd b.1· Congn•,;,- <H
a C'ongn'""Ionnl commii1Pe, Gravel v G'mted State.~ . .J-0~ l ' :S. at
025 , the fact of <·ongrP:-;sionnl authonzntton for thl' qllP>'ttonl'd HC't
IH not HuffirtPnt to 111~ulatE' the act from .Jlldtctal "<'T'Ittiny.
ln f>oll'rll
v. !lfcConnark. :39.5 U. S. 4H() (19(i9) , for tn Htnnc<• , W<' rrvtrwl'd the
actH of Hou"P Pmplo~'<'f'" "acttng pur,unnt to Pxprc·"~ ordPr~ of tlw
HouHr ." !d .. at 50.J-. Wr concludc•d that "although an action
agnm~t a Congn·H~man may l.Jp barred b~ tlw Spc•c·ch or l)pbatt ·
ClauHr, legi:;lati\'P c•mployrr" who part Icipatrd 111 tlw uncon"t It ut Ional
activity arr rr,;pon~ibiP for thr1r act, ." fb1d . ::)pp al~o Kilbour11 v.
Thomp8on. 10:{ U S l()k ( lHHI) : Dornh1·ou•sk1 v Ea8tland. ;~ki
L'. S H2 (H:J(i7) .
" ' Wr haY<' no occa~lon in this ca~l' to deridt> wlwtht•r or undPr what

circumstances, the Speech or Debate Clause would afford immumty
to distributors of allegedly actionable matenals from grand JUry
questioning, criminal charges, or a suit by the executive to restrain
distribution, where Congress has authomed the particular pubhc
distribution.

l
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wise would be to invite gratuitous injury to citizens for
little if any public purpose. We are unwilling to sanction such a result, at least absent more substantial evidence that, in order to perform its legislative function.
Congress must not only inform the public about the
fundamentals of its business but also must distribute
to the public generally materials otherwise actionable
under local law . The :-lpeech or DebatP Clause "tolerates
and protects behavior ou the part of Members not tolerated and protected when done by other citizPns. but the
shield does not extend beyond what is necessary to pn·~
serve the integrity of the legislative process. fT n ited
States v. Brewster, supra, at 517.
Contrary to the suggestion of our dissentmg Brethren.
Wt' cannot accept the proposition that our conclusio11.
that general, public di.::semination of materials otherwise actionable under local law is not protected by the
Speech or Debate Clause, will seriously undermine the
"informing function" of Congress. To the extent that
the Committee report is printed and mternally distributed
to Members of Congress under the protection of the
Speech or Debate Clause, the work of Congress 1s lll no
way iuhibited. Moreover. the intemal distributiOn 1s
"public'' in the sensP that materials internally circulated,
unless sheltered by specific congressional order, arc a vailable for inspection by the press and by the public. We
only deal. in the present case. with general, public distributwn beyond the halls of Con -resstand the establishments of 1ts fHnetw·ng, and beyond the apparent
needs of the "due functioning of the llegislativel process." United States v. Bre wster, supra, at 516.
That the Speech or Debate Clause has finite hmits is
important for present purposes. The complaint before
us alleges that the respondents caused the committee
report "to be distributed to the public," that "distribu~
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tion of the report continues to the present," and that
"unless restrained, defendants will continue to distribute
and publish" damaging information about petitioners and
their children. It does not expressly appear from the
complaint, nor is it contended in this Court, that either
the Members of Congress or the Committee personnel did
anything more than conduct the hearings, prepare the
Report, and authorize its publication. As we have stated,
such acts by those respondents are protected by the
Speech or Debate Clause and may not serve as a
predicate for a suit. The complaint was therefore
properly dismissed as to these respondents. Other respondents, however. are alleged to have carried out a
public distribution and to be ready to continue such
dissemination.
In response to these latter allegations, the Court of Appeals, after receiving sufficient assurances from the respondents that they had no intention of seeking a republication or carrying out further distribution of the report,
concluded that there was no basis for injunctive relief.
But this left the question whether any part of the previous publication and public distribution by respondents
other than the Members of Congress and Committee personnel went beyond the limits of the legislative immunity
provided by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Comstitution. Until that question was resolved, the complaint should not have been dismissed on threshold immunity grounds, unless the Court of Appeals was correct
in ruling that the action against the other respondents
was foreclosed by the doctrine of official immunity, a
question to which we now turn .''
'' While an mq uiry such a:s is mvolvcd m th e pre~r nt case, bPca u:se
it mvol ves two coo rdin a t e bran ches of Government , mu:st n ecC'ssa ni~ ·
ha ve ~r p nra ti o n of p ower tm phcat ions, t he separa ti on of pow(' fs do('t rine has not prrv10usly pr<'vcntf'd tht::; Co urt from rC'vtewmg t lw
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II
The official immunity doctrine, which "has in large
part been of judicial making," Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S.
564, 569 ( 1959), confers immunity on government officials of suitable rank for the reason that "officials of
government should be free to exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts
done in the course of those duties-suits which would
consume time and energies which would otherwise be
devoted to governmental service and the threat of which
might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government." I d., at
571.'~ The official immunity doctrine seeks to reconcile
two important considerations" [ 0] n the one hand, the protection of the individual
citizens against pecuniary damage caused by oppressive or malicious action on the part of officials of
the Federal Government; and on the other, the protection of the public interest by shielding responsible
governmental officers against the harassment and
inevitable hazards of vindictive or ill-founded damage suits brought on account of action taken in the
exercise of their official responsibilities." I d., at 565.
In the Barr case, the Court reaffirmed existing immunity law but made it clear that the immunity conferred
might not be the same for all officials for all purposes.
!d., at 573; see also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S., at
acts of Congrc;;;;, ser, e. g., Kilbourn v. Thomp~on, supra; Dombrows!c~ v. Eastland, supra, even when the Exrcnttvr Branch to; abo
involved, see, e. g.. United States v Brewster. supra; Gravel v

United States, supra.
'"Both bPfore and aftpr Barr, olfictal tmmuntty ha:; lwPn hPid applicable to officials of the Legislative Branch. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82

(1967) .
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378; Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82, 85 (1967).
Judges, like executive officers with discretionary functions, have been held absolutely immune regardless of
their motive or good faith. Barr v. Matteo, supra, at
569; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-555 (1967). But
policemen and like officials apparently enjoy a more
limited privilege. I d., at 555-558. Also, the Court determined in Barr that the scope of immunity from
defamation suits should be determined by the relation
of the publication complained of to the duties entrusted
to the officer. Barr v. Matteo, supra, at 573-574; see also
the companion case, H award v. Lyons, 360 U. S. 593,
597-598 (1959). The scope of immunity has always
been tied to the "scope of authority." Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647, 651 (1963). In the legislative
context, for instance, "[t]his Court has not hesitated
to sustain the rights of private individuals when it found
Congress was acting outside its legislative role." Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, at 377. Thus, we have recognized "the immunity of legislators for acts within the
legislative role," Pierson v. Ray, supra, at 554 ( 1967),
but have carefully confined that immunity to protect
only acts within "the sphere of legitimate legislative
activity." T euney v. Brandhove, supra, at 376; cf.
Powell v. McCormack, supra, at 486.
Because the Court has not fashioned a fixed, invariable
rule of immunity but has advised a discerning inquiry
into whether the contributions of immunity to effective
government in particular contexts outweighs the perhaps
recurring harm to individual citizens, there is no readymade answer as to whether the remaining fec!eral respondents-the Public Printer and the Superintendent of
Documents-should be accorded absolute immunity in
this case. Of course, to the extent that they serve legislative functions, the performance of which would be immune conduct if done by congressmen, these officials

I
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enjoy the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause.
Our inquiry here, however, is whether, if they participate
in publication and distribution beyond the legislative
sphere, and thus beyond the protection of the Speech or
Debate Clause, they are nevertheless protected by the
doctrine of official immunity. Our starting point is at
least a minimum familiarity with their functions and
duties.
The statutes of the United States create the office of
Public Printer to manage and supervise the Government
Printing Office, which, with certain exceptions, is the authorized printer for the various branches of the Federal
Government. 44 U. S. C. § 301. "Printing and binding may be done at the Government Printing Office only
when authorized by law." § 501. The Public Printer
is authorized to do printing for Congress, §§ 701-741,
901- 910, as well as for the Executive and Judicial
Branches of Government, §§ 1101- 1123. The Public
Printer is authorized to appoint the Superintendent of
Documents with duties concerning the distribution and
sale of documents. §~ 1701- 1722.
Under the applicable statutes, when either House of
Congress orders a document printed. the Printer is to
print the "usual number" unless a greater number is
ordered. § 701. The " usual number" is 1,682, to be
divided between bound and unbound copies and distributed to named officers or offices of the House and
Senate, to the Library of Congress, and to the Superintendent of Documents for furth er distribution "to the
State libraries and designated depositories." I bid.'"
There are also statutory provisions for the printing of
w For th e nuth on zat1011 to ~ uppl~ · ~ uJJi c i r 11t eop ie:o for ~ u e h distribution see § 738. The Public Print er is also required to furnish the
Department of State with 20 copies of all congre::; ·ional documents,
and reports. 44 U S. C. § 715,
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extra copies, § 702, bills and resolutions, § 706- 708, public
and private laws, postal conventions, and treaties, §§ 709712, journals, § 713, the Congressional Directory, § 721722, memorial addresses, § 723- 724, and the Statutes at
Large , ~ 728- 729 . Section 733 provides that "[t]he Public Printer on order of a Member of Congress, on prepayment of costs, may reprint documents and reports of
committees together with the evidence papers submitted.
or any part ordered printed by the Congress."
With respect to printing for the Executive and Judicial
Branches, it is provided that " [a] head of an executive
department .. . may not cause to be printed, and the
Public Printer may not print, a document or matter
unless it is authorized by law and necessary to the public
business." § 1102 (a). The executive departments and
the courts are to requisition printing by certifying that
it is "necessary for the public service." § 1103.
The Superintendent of Documents has charge of the
distribution of all public documents except those printed
for use of the executive departments, "which shall be
delivered to the departments," and for either House of
Congress, "which shall be delivered to the Senate Service
Department and House of Representatives Publications
Distribution Service." § 1702. He is thus in charge of
the public sale and distribution of documents. The Public Printer is instructed to "print additional copies of a
Government publication, not confidential in character,
required for sale to the public by the Superintendent of
Documents," subject to regulation by the Joint Committee on Printing. § 1705.
It is apparent that under this statutory framework,
the printing of documents and their general distribution
to the public would be "within the outer perimeter" of
the statutory duties of the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents. Barr v. Mat eo, supra, at 575.
Thus, if official immunity automatically attaches to any
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conduct expressly or impliedly authorized by law, the
Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the complaint
against these officials. This, however, is not the governing rule.
The duties of the Public Printer and his appointee, the
Superintendent of Documents, are to print, handle, distribute, and sell government documents. The Government Printing Office acts as a service organization for
the branches of the Government. What it prints is produced elsewhere and is printed and distributed at the
direction of the Congress, the departments, the independent agencies and offices, or the Judicial Branch of the
Government. The Public Printer and Superintendent
of Documents exercise discretion only with respect to
estimating the demand for particular documents and adjusting the supply accordingly. The existence of a Public Printer makes it unnecessary for every government
agency and office to have a printer of its own. The Printing Office is independently created and manned and
imbued with its own statutory duties ; but, we do not
think that its independent establishment carries with it
an independent immunity. Rather, the Printing Office
is immune from suit when it prints for an executive department for example, only to the extent that it would
be if it were part of the department itself or, in other
words, to the extent that the department head himself
would be immune if he ran his own pnnting press and
distributed his own documents. To hold otherwise would
mean that an executive department could acquire immunity for non-immune materials merely by presenting
the proper certificate to the Public Printer, who would
then have the duty to print the material. Under such a
holding, the department would have a seemingly foolproof method for manufacturing immunity for materials
which the court would not otherwise hold immune if not
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sufficiently connected with the "official duties" of the
department. H award v. Lyons, 360 U. S., at 597.
Congress has conferred no express, statutory immunity
on the Public Printer or the Superintendent of Documents. Congress has not provided that these officials
should be immune for printing and distributing materials
where those who author the materials would not be.
We thus face no statutory or constitutional problems in
interpreting this doctrine of "judicial making. " Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U. S., at 569. We do, however, write in the
shadow of Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408
U. S. 564 (1972), and Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U. S. 433 (1971), where the Court advised caution
"[w]here a person's good name, reputation , honor, or
integrity is at stake because of what the government is
doing to him ... ." I d., at 437. We conclude that, for
the purposes of the judicially fashioned doctrine of immunity, the Printer and the Superintendent of Documents are no more free from suit in the case before us
than would be a legislative aide who made copies of the
materials at issue and distributed them to the public at
the direction of his superiors. See Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967). The scope of inquiry becomes
equivalent to the inquiry in the context of the Speech
or Debate Clause, and the answer is the same. The
business of Congress is to legislate ; congressmen and
aides are absolutely immune when they are legislating.
But when they act outside the "sphere of legitimate
legislative activity." Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S., at
376, they enjoy no special immunity from local laws protecting the good name or the reputation of the ordinary
citizen.
Because we think the Court of Appeals applied the
immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause and of the
doctrine of official immunity too broadly, we must reverse
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its judgment and remand the rase for appropnate fur~
thcr proC'eedings. 17 \Vc• are unawan•. from this rc•c·ord.
of the extent of the publication and distribution of the
Report which has taken place to date. Thus \\'C have
little basis for judging whether the legitimate legislative
needs of Congress. and hence the limits of immunity,
have been exceeded. These matters are for the lower
courts in the first instance.
Of course, like the Court of Appeals, we indicate noth~
ing as to whether petitioners have pleaded a. good cause
of action or whether respondents have other defenses,
constitutional or otherwise. We have dealt only with
the threshold question of immuttity. 1 '
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in
part and affirmed in part, and the case is remanded to
the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent.
with this opinion.
1

o ordered.

17
With n·~p<•<·t to the I )t~tt'l<'t of ('olumhta n·~potHI<·nt". tlw Colll't
of Appeals found that they werr actmg withu1 the "l'OJ><' of thetr
authorit~· under applicable law and, a;; a rrsult , wen• immurw from
suit. We do not di:4urh the judgment of the Court of Appeab Ill
thi respect.
18 \Y<• thu" h:tl'<' no orca~1011 to <'OII~rd<·r ,\rt. I, § 5. !'! . :;, IY!tl!'li
requires that '· Each Housr shall krrp a Journal of rts Proceedings,
and from time to time publish the same, excepting :;uch Part s as
may in their .Judgment require Secrecy
"; nor need we deal
with publications of the .Judicral Branc·h and thr legal Immunities
that may be attarhed. thereto
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